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 The purpose of this research is to critique existing kinship ideologies embedded in 
case law regarding marriage rights in the United States.  The research centers on the gay 
marriage rights movement and critically analyzes how U.S. v. Windsor has been taken up 
legally, politically, in the media, and by organizat ons.  By examining exclusionary 
practices stemming from the marriage equality movement I navigate the motives of an 
ethical politics of kinship care.  The thesis focuses on the differentiation between 
mainstream agendas such as the ones employed by Human Rights Campaign (HRC) with 
the comprehensive approach to legal reform suggested by queer advocacy organizations.  
By building coalitions and employing queer politics, an ethical politics of kinship care 
can be envisioned in order to create transformationl change.  My interest lies with how 
the (re)distribution of resources come to exist through legal/political operations; in 
particular, my thesis examines how the well-being of vulnerable populations and people 
deemed disposable by society can all be protected within a future vision of an ethical 
politics of kinship care.
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For everyone I share a kinship relationship with; you remind me of what 
matters in life – each other …    
 
Your life and my life flow into each other as wave flows into wave, and unless 
there is peace and joy and freedom for you, there can be no real peace or joy or 
freedom for me.  To see reality – not as we expect it to be but as it is – is to see 
that unless we live for each other and in and through each other, we do not really 
live very satisfactorily; that there can really be lif only where there really is, in 
just this sense, love. (Frederick Buechner) 
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CHAPTER I 
 
TRANSFORMING KINSHIP CARE 
 
 
So many of us long for communities in which there is systemic affirmation, 
valuing, and nurturing of difference, and in which conformity to a narrow and 
restricting vision is never demanded as the price of admission to caring civil 
society (Acey et al.). 
 
 
How does “family” get constructed within political policy?  What are different 
ways of looking at or defining “communities”?  How are people demanded to live out 
kinship, and in what ways?  What is the discursive life of kinship: how is it being defined 
even if it is not being talked about in the same way? 
Kinship ideologies and the differing ways in which people are demanded to live 
out kinship appeals to me from a personal as well as ac demic standpoint.  My academic 
understanding of marriage is based upon its location within the spaces of capitalism, 
colonialism, and consumerism accompanied by its raci t, homophobic, and classist 
(“historical”) affiliations.  As an adolescent, I felt firsthand the detrimental effects from 
not belonging to or appropriately displaying the cultural ideals of an intelligible “family” 
structure.  Facing puberty within the rural walls of an all-girls home in a small Montana 
town, my kinship reality which consisted of two legal uardians and thirty-three teenage 
girls was continually scrutinized within public spaces and the local community.  The 
public school system perpetuated the idea of a nuclear family model through non-
inclusive language (i.e. assuming every student had a mother, father, sibling(s), blood 
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relationship, and/or non-institutionalized home lif) in addition to assessing academic and 
societal successes based on traditional assumptions concerning extracurricular 
activities/hobbies (i.e. students who participate in a sport show a lower chance for “at 
risk” behaviors) without any regard to situations that don’t grant that necessary support 
(transportation, funding, emotional, etc. supports) for such commendable choices or 
“accomplishments.”  As in my case, I was required to rely on the public school bus every 
day as the only possible form of transportation back- nd-forth from the all-girls home to 
school and was often denied any additional financial support or income for 
extracurricular activities, in particular dancing since that was a passion of mine prior to 
living at the Montana home.  Considering the constructed ideal of kinship enforced by 
dominant systems/institutions, I felt rejected from both social/academic arenas and was 
faced with economic/political/legal inequities.  Re-conceptualizing what/who constitutes 
as “family” and recognizing diverse kinship care formations will assist in the big-picture 
endeavor of creating social/political/economical/legal justices and safe spaces through an 
ethical politics of kinship care.   
Each girl came from different backgrounds and led different lives prior to the 
Montana home.  All of our varied paths crossed one another at the common ground of 
suddenly becoming “family,” and therefore there is a bond between all of the girls that no 
one can ever take away from us.  We are bonded by our shared experience as lost souls 
who were placed together; we gave new meaning to “sisterhood” and have since learned 
the importance that this has had in shaping our young adult lives.  Uncertainties in life 
and in life’s journey were a shared understanding we all came to know through the years 
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of adolescence: which ones of us would have the magical story of leaving by virtue of 
someone wanting us; who would run away from the girls’ home next; what happens when 
we age out of care systems; etc.?  We now know to prepare ourselves, mentally and 
physically, for the inevitable unknown.  And, most importantly, we now know what it 
feels like to be considered disposable people whose well-being was a second thought or 
sometimes even non-existent within political and socio-economical arenas. 
We were ostracized by the local community since no o e could understand what 
kind of lifestyle we went home to after school, or why we didn’t have the “normal 
parents.”  How could we all, thirty-four teenage girls, live under the same roof 
(metaphorically, there were actually 4 roofs within the same property line) and why were 
we there?  What was wrong with us?  Why didn’t our “real families” want us anymore?  
The all-girls home was our form of kinship care now.  New “parents/guardians,” and for 
some girls, the first parents they had ever known, were now in charge of our quality of 
life.  Over the past few years, I have regained a solid relationship with my “biological” 
parents and now view them as part of my close kinship formation.  Yet, “parent” doesn’t 
even begin to define what my relationship with any of these individuals who have held 
that sort of responsibility over me really is like.  There is more complexity to our 
relationships, and there is more chronological meaning and emotional depth to each of 
those relationships than can be understood in one nrmalized word such as “parent.” 
In order to narrow the scope of this thesis, I focus on the kinship topic of marriage 
rights over the last 30 years in the U.S. within case law and queer organizing.  Based on 
this analysis, I propose an ethical politics of kinship care for future visions and offer a 
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starting point to the critical praxis of applying kinship theory into practice.  I investigate 
gay marriage rights as one specific site as to where kinship ideologies get taken up and 
disposability gets produced.  My critical analysis reaches farther than current liberal 
critiques regarding exclusionary practices within the gay marriage rights movement; 
instead, I am claiming that the current version of the gay marriage rights movement 
actually produces disposable populations through exclusionary practices and the 
reiteration of kinship norms. 
Since the basis of my recommendations center on the core understanding of how 
we treat one another as human beings, I apply the term ethical; and I use the term politics 
due to the political framework surrounding my thesis.  Kinship care is a more inclusive 
term that extends past the exclusionary practices of marriage and instead recognizes any 
and all forms of kinship. The term kinship is taken up and understood in complex and 
diverse ways.  Social anthropologists study the kinship of nonwestern cultures, while 
sociology tends to focus its studies on modern kinship within the West (i.e., gay and 
lesbian family structures).  Originating from the discipline of anthropology, kinship 
studies’ focus is on social and cultural relationship .  Morgan’s Ancient Society, 
published in 1877, focused on “evolutionary kinship and marriage theory” and is 
considered the literary origin of kinship (Makarius 709). 
 I am not the first person to introduce the idea of kinship care structures that 
question marriage equality as a political goal (Spade; Cohen; Eng; Duggan; Acey; 
DeFilippis; Dasgupta; Boggis; Pharr; Polikoff; among others).  Nonetheless, “not many 
theorists who invoke intersectionality have interprted identities as coalitions, nor have 
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many pursued coalition as a challenge to single-axis conceptions of identity” (Carastathis 
946).  Kinship discourses pertaining to the marriage debate and the foster care system 
account for the vast majority of accessible resources.  However, there is a lack of 
scholarship on intersectional analysis that reconfigures kinship or attempts to remove it 
completely from regimes of power disparities.  Literatures on kinship care regarding 
children who have aged out of foster care are unfortunately slim to nonexistent.  The 
foster care system often enforces kinship structures by taking children, disproportionately 
children of color and/or from a low income class, away due to familial incarceration; 
imprisonment can also leave families with extreme cases of financial loss.  Queer politics 
offers promise of identifying issues left out of dominating institutions.  Borrowing from 
Gust Yep, Karen Lovaas, and John Elia’s closing paragraph within their introduction in 
the Journal of Homosexuality, I find my own thesis’ goals accurately represented within 
the following citation: 
 
It is our hope that you find the pages of this volume filled with ideas that 
stimulate, provoke, and galvanize you to think about the multiplicity of issues 
relating to queer theory and communication studies in terms of theory, praxis, 
intervention, and the lived experience.  In the spirit of queer theory, none of these 
terms can be contained by neat boundaries; they oftn bleed together, offering 
unique opportunities for each of us to explore and expand (8-9). 
 
  Kinship issues are often thought about in separated reas of focus; however, I am 
calling for a coalition approach to advocate for kinship policies that focus on 
intersectional situations within a decolonized framework.  By building a coalition, issues 
of kinship which have been taken up within political movements would align themselves 
6 
with one another as allies instead of many mainstream movements’ common approach of 
using differences among kinship formations as a foundational evidence for identity/group 
segregation.  In other words, instead of gay marriage dvocacy groups’ promotion of gay 
marriage rights, there would be an alliance between that movement’s aims and that of all 
of the other kinship advocacy groups such as the ones dealing with child care, chosen 
families’ rights, immigrations rights, etc.  I understand that there is no such thing as a 
unified objective which all groups agree on, due to the diversity among the groups as well 
as within the groups.  However, many kinship advocacy groups are fighting “the good 
fight” without regard to how their assimilation tacics within the greater government 
institution will affect the future of all kinship ideologies. 
Alliances can be formed based upon common ground found among different 
identity categories.  David Crimp states, “Political identifications remaking identities are, 
of course, productive of collective political struggle, but only if they result in a 
broadening of alliances rather than an exacerbation of a tagonisms” (16).  In addition to 
building a coalition around political motivations, “Ideally, integration occurs not only at 
the level of the political movement but at the very personal level of one’s own embodied 
identity” (Carastathis 960).  According to Frost, “personal projects allow for a 
transactional approach to personality, behavior, and motivation, placing a person in 
context and understanding context through a person’s project pursuits” (286).  My 
research is focused on how present-day activism or "m vements" contribute to or impact 
the future rather than simply applying a quick-fix Band-Aid over existing political and 
legal issues without regard to kinship’s origins and existence within imperialist and 
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colonialist structural inequities.  Although some good models for coalition building 
centered on different areas of kinship already exist (i.e., Sylvia Rivera Law Project), none 
have discussed kinship in the way that I wish to pursue it as a fulcrum which connects 
distinct – yet intersecting – arenas within socio-political movements.  As a way to narrow 
my research for the purposes of this thesis, I have chosen to focus on the LGBTQAI 
communities’ relationship to/with/within kinship ideologies.  As I locate myself within 
the community of queer scholarship, I hope to critically engage in the discussions 
concerning how kinship care is regulated and produce .  However, I understand my 
thesis as merely a small portion of a deeper and more complex conversation advocating 
for movements to build coalitions extending beyond the scope of LGBTQAI 
communities; nonetheless, for the purposes of this scholarly work, I focus my research on 
a more specific undertaking of kinship care within the gay marriage rights movement.  In 
an attempt to continue this necessary dialogue on transforming how property and other 
economic resources are distributed, I plan to extend my research’s scope in the future to 
address how kinship care can affect and be experienced by additional vulnerable 
populations.  I hope that other activists and scholars apply my findings to their own 
curriculums, perspectives, and/or epistemologies. 
My research is two-fold.  First and foremost, I focus on how case law 
impacts/influences the social condition/understandings of kinship.  Chapter II will follow 
one famous/major legal case regarding gay marriage ghts – U.S. v. Windsor – along 
with Chapter III’s focus on the involvement of the Human Rights Campaign Foundation 
(HRC).  I chose U.S. v. Windsor because of its significant impact on gay marriage ri hts, 
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the concurrent timing of the court’s legal decision with my own thesis research, and the 
explicit examples it provides of how legal issues of kinship care can intersect with other 
political areas.  For the purpose of this thesis as well as the driving force behind my own 
scholarly interests in queer theory, I will not use th  original legal document of U.S. v. 
Windsor to summarize the case, court decision, and/or the legal policy changes that 
follow it.  I will gather my information through law reviews found on LexisNexis, case 
summaries/breakdowns published by queer organizations, and news coverage reported by 
popular/well-known media sources.  I have chosen mai stream media as a valid source 
for analyzing the political and social climates surro nding gay marriage rights since, 
“The media and the personalities they have envisioned have replaced the dominant image 
of the democratic sphere that we have traditionally had” (Crenshaw, “Identity Factor 
Multiculturalism”).  Following up with the case’s verdict and HRC’s media focus, I will 
summarize the impact of the decision on the public’s understanding of ideologies of 
kinship care, the redistribution of resources, as well as any future implications it holds on 
creating an ethical politics of kinship care. 
Secondly, I focus my thesis on contrasting mainstream movements with queer 
organizing methods.  The concluding chapter, Chapter IV, centers on coalition politics 
both within the legal/political arena and on a social grassroots platform.  Taken up as a 
queer response to Chapter II’s focus on the institution of marriage along with Chapter 
III’s focus on mainstream assimilationist agendas, Chapter IV integrates how queer 
politics can be influential in the creation of an ethical politics of kinship care. 
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I will also focus on the limiting ways that specifi usages and assumptions of 
kinship are taken up within politics and case law to affect nationalist economic and social 
projects/agendas.  Although the purpose of my thesis does not include a concrete 
endorsement for an exclusive envision of kinship care, my hope is to ignite a critical 
discussion regarding the creation of a future ethical politics of kinship care centered on 
the social and political needs of the most vulnerabl  people.  I interchange the terms kin
and kinship to validate both words, since legal discourse surrounding the issue of kinship 
often uses the legal phrase “next of kin” in U.S. policies. 
For current and historical representations of kinship, I use the term ideology to 
describe an idea/concept as belonging to a group of kinship ideologies.  According to 
Valocchi, an ideological dimension includes how meaning is developed through 
systematic movements “that both legitimate the movement’s existence and move people 
to act” (445-6).  Kinship ideologies are understood as knowledge that produces/uses 
normative force through institutions and are fixated on what is established as “natural” – 
an unchanging, traditional sense of essentialism.  As for current kinship ideologies, I 
research the documented arenas in which kinship already has a functioning role within 
our culture in order to acknowledge the interdependence among all of the arenas.  For any 
references to my future hopes and recommendations, I use the phrase thical politics of 
kinship care which is based in political policy and social plans.  Throughout the thesis, I 
continuously add insight and depth to the phrase’s meaning so as to let the reader also 
envision their own hopes and make their own connections of my research findings.  In 
other words, I am critiquing kinship ideologies in their current state, while envisioning a 
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future for an ethical politics of kinship care by supporting a critical analysis and 
forwarding a meaningful/ongoing discussion. 
 In creating an ethical politics of kinship care, I call for a three-pronged approach.  
The first point involves (re)definition.  Changing definitions is the principal claim I make 
in regards to the transformation of current kinship ideologies towards a more inclusive, 
comprehensive, and intersectional understanding or definition of kinship care; in other 
words, this arena encompasses my vision’s key kinship care element.  We need to 
generate an inclusive understanding of kinship, an understanding that cannot be limited to 
a singular definition and that can also reach any-and- ll realities of how people 
experience kinship.  Commonly, kinship has usually been defined in terms of marriage 
and/or lines of descent.  In crafting an expanded definition of kinship, I include these 
traditional definitions as well as expand upon them.  Ideally, people should be able to 
claim/name the people whom they wish to have kinship ties with and also be able to 
declaim/denounce kinship ties even if they are blood-related.  My idea for an ethical 
politics of kinship care extends past the legal bounds of romantic monogamist 
relationships as well as beyond the scope of LGBTQAI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, queer, asexual, intersex) relations. 
 Secondly, we must understand economic viability within ethical objectives.  By 
changing the socio-political values placed on all kinship possibilities by validating and 
valuing all formations and types of kinship care, I consider this to be related to my 
vision’s ethical piece based on how we treat one another as human beings.  Many 
vulnerable groups of people feel the effects of state control over who is allowed to define 
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kinship ties and in what ways; examples of state control include but are not limited to: tax 
benefits, property rights, and power of attorney.  Through this vulnerability of political 
and socio-economical inequities, instances of disposable people are found. 
 I am not interested in analyzing legal rights in great detail, but rather my interest 
lies with the (re)distribution of resources through legal/political operations.  Disposability 
is central to my thesis and the scholarly discussion I am calling for in regards to creating 
an ethical politics of kinship care.  Kinship provides differential access and distribution of 
economic resources (e.g. property rights) based on legally recognized relations/ties.  
There are several ways in which kinship is used politically, legally, socially, and 
economically in order to distribute resources.  Employers can regulate kinship relations, 
socially and economically, by determining the “legitimate” time to mourn over the death 
of a “family relative” by regulating the “appropriate” amount of personal days to take off 
work.  Other non-traditional forms of families, including chosen families, are not legally 
or politically recognized as being eligible for economic resources.  Chosen families are 
often formed in LGBT communities due to marginalization; for example, during the 
AIDS crisis of the 1980’s and early 1990’s, “Pockets of community members became 
caretakers overnight and across the region were comrades in action with lesbians stepping 
into the breach to help their fallen brothers” (Murphy 12).  Senior citizens living together 
who rely emotionally on one another are considered having nontraditional kinship bonds; 
i.e. some relationships found in nursing homes betwe n senior citizens.  Native American 
families were legally regulated – and oppressed – through the Dawes Act of 1887 which 
distributed small amounts of land to individuals baed on age and relationship status 
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(Stremlau).  This act also operated to assimilate Native Americans within colonial 
policies due to Native families’ unlikeness with that of the “traditional” nuclear family 
(Stremlau 265).  Mormon family structures are not considered legal due to their 
polygamous nature (Witte). 
The third prong surrounding my ethical politics of kinship care involves politics 
and policy.  Changing laws to better protect the well-b ing of all humans rather than a 
select, privileged few undergirds my vision’s politics stance.  Instead of using 
assimilating strategies regarding kinship in current l gal and political arenas, I call for a 
deconstruction of those arenas that create/reiterate structural inequities while focusing on 
what/where/how kinship alternatives exist within the world.  Queer organizing methods 
offer an alternative strategy for LGBTQIA communities in obtaining equitable justices 
through building coalitions with other vulnerable populations to reform kinship care 
policies.   
 In writing this thesis, I have made a conscious decision to not explicitly name the 
connections I have made during the analysis that I share throughout the following 
chapters.  Since the goal of this scholarly work is to ignite an ongoing conversation rather 
than finding a clear cut solution, I wanted to allow for the reader to engage in self-
discovery; thus, opening up more space for the reader to make connections and add their 
own conversational insight into the discussion.  In other words, I expect the questions that 
I open each chapter with to be a guiding force for the reader to problem-solve through 
and come to their own opinions/conclusions since each reader has important intellectual 
power/insight to bring to the conversation of dispoability and an ethical politics of 
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kinship care.  In the critical moments of decompositi n throughout my thesis, my hope is 
for you to engage in a critical discourse analysis that promotes a sense of hesitation.  In 
other words, when considering legal reform to kinshp care policies, it is useful to hesitate 
before making any certain claims on kinship care policies.  This enactment of hesitation 
reduces the tendency to create assumptions and instead promotes the methodology of 
critical analysis.   
Theoretical Framework 
Guided by a queer approach, my thesis examines the intersections between queer 
theory and kinship ideologies.  I see queer scholarship/inquiry as a potential radical site 
that continuously contends against the normalization of being simplistically defined, 
disciplined, and regulated.  Queer theory engages in a “discussion that links perception, 
practice, performance and the politics of sexual identity to race, ethnicity, culture, time, 
place, and the discourse produced within these disparate locations” (Alexander 349-50).  
This interdisciplinary approach is essential in building coalitions centered on the 
reformation of kinship care politics. 
Queer politics “has the effect of pointing out a wide field of normalization, rather 
than simple intolerance, as the site of violence” (Warner 16).  By implementing queer 
politics in the context of kinship care, my analysis eeks greater depth into questioning 
the implications shaped by the mainstream gay rights movement.  My claim that the 
movement not only embodies exclusionary practices but also actively participates in the 
production of disposable persons is grounded in queer politics.  The process of queer 
politics further signifies my call for hesitation: prior to claiming any future ethical 
14 
politics of kinship care, we need to hesitate on any potential shortcomings that dispossess 
any groups/populations. 
Queer scholarship/theory, although appropriate and necessary, also needs to 
adhere to a critical analysis of its own development and implementation of discourse 
within the circular/fluid framework of reflection, egotiation, and/or transformation.  By 
implementing a moment of hesitation, we can identify any detrimental effects stemming 
from the implementation of queer politics.  Without a clear definition and/or distinct 
intentions, “queer” can reiterate dangerous assumptions within any given context.  
However, I view this lack of a singular definition as an opportunity for flexibility by not 
clearly defining the uses or intentions of queer politics.  Unfortunately, some individuals 
assume the term “queer” is read within a context of a polarized dichotomy between 
essentialism/heterosexual versus intersectionalism/queer.  By distinguishing heterosexual 
from “the other,” this polarized dichotomy groups all areas that do not fall within the 
narrowly defined essentialism/heterosexual as queer which significantly devalues the 
plurality and multiplicity that queerness has the opp rtunity to diversely value.  Although 
this can be a plausible definition, I define queer as holding the figurative position of an 
active verb with the potential to alter normalized r search approaches and to further 
challenge power disparities generated from declaring and/or focusing on subjecthood.  In 
my thesis, queer represents an anti-assimilationist approach that opposes previous social 
movements’ inclusionary goals within dominating institutions. 
Contrasting some of the ineffective outcomes from civil rights strategies, Cathy 
Cohen’s “Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer 
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Politics?” introduces a left political framework.  Cohen’s leftist political framework leads 
my own theoretical framework concerning power differentials, political frameworks, and 
transformative solutions.  Her article also contributes information regarding ACT UP, a 
New York-based advocacy group, and its influence.  ACT UP participates in queer 
organizing and is made up of “a diverse, non-partisn group of individuals united in 
anger and committed to direct action to end the AIDS crisis” (ACT UP New York).  The 
organization has built a coalition among any-and-all areas/issues/people affected by the 
AIDS crisis; this is an example of a leftist approach’s multiple-oppression framework (as 
opposed to the single-issue framing of marriage takn up by the mainstream gay marriage 
rights movement) in the formation of coalition politics.   
I explore the future possibilities for an ethical po itics of kinship care within a 
leftist political framework.  According to Cohen, a leftist political framework centralizes 
the interdependency among several dominating systems and institutions with emphasis on 
economic exploitation and/or class structure (“Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens” 
442).  The following are overarching questions to consider during the following 
investigation into political reforms regarding kinship care: What does it mean to engage 
in political and legal discussions regarding kinship?  What is at stake?  When something 
disrupts the boundaries/regulations of pre-established social constructions similar to the 
queering of a supposed normative, feelings of discomfort and unease tend to persist in the 
face of the unknown or the unexplored. 
In hopes of pacifying some of the discomfort associated with creating an ethical 
politics of kinship care that is not yet conceivable or identifiable, a radical advocacy 
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group commonly referred to as Beyond Marriage has requested the marriage equality 
campaign’s agenda “to include a broader set of relationships and the goals of social and 
economic justice for more of us than marriage, as it exists in current law, can provide” 
(Duggan).  In 2006, the radical group issued a leftist s rategic vision that has the potential 
be used as a preliminary guideline to re-defining ad re-conceptualizing kinship care, 
families, and communities.  Its vision statement makes certain to disarm itself from 
condemning the kinship choice of marriage, and instead it acknowledges the unfair 
treatment of marriage within larger kinship legislation and situates the strategic vision’s 
scope to include all human beings.  According to the vision statement, one of the primary 
goals for the future of kinship care involves humans’ abilities in: 
 
Shaping for themselves the relationships, unions, ad informal kinship systems 
that validate and support their daily lives, the lives they are actually living, 
regardless of what direction the current ideological winds might be blowing 
(Acey et al.). 
 
 
This statement from the group’s vision clearly outlines the visionary principles I also 
hope to enforce, together with recreating the term “communities” through encouraging 
and non-exploitive terms.  I want to imagine a world where this possibility can become a 
reality for all humans. 
Identity Politics 
Even though I focus on the role of identity politics primarily in Chapter III, I feel 
it is important to incorporate a brief overview here since identity politics can be applied 
to many significant and foundational aspects through t my thesis.  Identity politics is 
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also one of the methodological bases my thesis process undertakes.  I understand identity 
politics to be multi-faceted and varied in use.  In the context of this thesis, identity 
politics refers to the use of identity categories that can create a feeling of solidarity and 
inclusion as well as a theoretical place for celebration among differences.    
In keeping with Butler’s understanding of identity categories as a “political 
imperative to these necessary errors or category mistakes, as it were to rally and represent 
an oppressed political constituency” (356); I agree with the assertion that although 
sometimes problematic, identity formations are a necessary evil within academic research 
and disciplined studies.  Nevertheless, I feel it is mportant to negotiate and document this 
paradox rather than to accept it as an unexplored truth in order to cognize the persistent 
investigation into how this paradox affects the production of knowledge.  I intend to 
engage in deconstructionist politics by disrupting a d negotiating identity categories and 
examining the limited constructions found in some pers ectives on a collective identity 
theory. 
Many scholars (Cohen, Puar, Butler, Spade, Kirsch, and others) have 
contemplated the possibility/potential to fuse identity politics, radical/leftist frameworks, 
and coalition politics.  Kirsch emphasizes the “need to identify with social movements 
rather than solely identify as an individualized I” (12).  I apply this concept to the 
assessment of alternative ways in which identity politics could benefit from an ethical 
politics of kinship care through using identity “as  mode of affiliation rather than strictly 
as a category of personal definition” (Kirsch 7).  Cohen references how leftist politics can 
be positively linked with identity politics: “while undoubtedly informed by our identity, 
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must extend beyond our particular circumstances and t ke root in a larger vision of how 
we actualize, at the very least, a just and equal society” (“Movement to My Politics” 
115).  I will be investigating the use of identity politics to address the gay marriage rights 
movement as well as to claim a transformational approach to queer/radical discourses 
concerning kinship.   
My choice to incorporate identity politics within my research stems from my 
uneasiness with it due to the common misunderstanding and misuse of identity politics 
within political arenas.  I understand the benefits that identity politics necessitate, which 
include the creation of a rallying point which many activist movements center on, the 
feeling of solidarity among individuals, and the eas  in which academics input “identity 
politics” within research as a concept that is assumed to be widely understood and 
“accepted.”  It is of equal importance not to dismis identity politics as a political/legal 
strategy without first evaluating any potential risks at stake in addition to any benefits of 
employing it. 
Identity politics’ role in kinship could have a detrimental effect if used 
inappropriately – as in essentialist language or assimilation tactics.  Using identity 
politics, groups of people have the option to categorize or label themselves within a set 
identity category.  However, neoliberal movements tend to use identity politics as a 
method of regulating and demanding individuals to be categorized or labeled.  
Neoliberalism can be defined as “the investment and integration of social movements into 
state-sponsored institutions, such as electoral power, market power, marriage, citizenship, 
and the military” (Brooks).  My vision for a future ethical politics of kinship care resists 
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these boxes and allows individuals to name their own relationships with other people 
based on personal opinion rather than criteria.  According to Spade: 
 
Because equality- and rights-seeking arguments often reproduce deservingness 
frameworks, participate in logics and structures that undergird relations of 
domination, and become sites for the expansion of harmful systems and 
institutions, they often divide constituencies seeking change (“Intersectional 
Resistance” 1039).   
 
 
And this further proves my point that in order to assimilate into an existent legal 
institution; one must simultaneously validate the institution as admirable and, therefore, 
neglect opportunities for the necessary support in a critical analysis of the institution’s 
effectiveness and ethical politics status. 
Identities are not static as sometimes assumed within conservative discussions 
referencing identity politics; sometimes, identity politics can be used in a problematic 
standpoint by not negotiating or acknowledging all individuals’ choice to self-identify 
within/to a particular identity category/label, but instead individuals are sometimes forced 
into them.  For example, some women from “Third world countries” (I acknowledge the 
problems and complexities which this phrase carries; however, for the purpose of this 
explanation it is fitting) who come to the United States are faced with – and labeled as – 
an identity category that may not fit with their self-identification: “women of color.”  The 
identity category “women of color” does not reflect the complexities and diversities 
within that identity marker but instead proposes/impl es that the category references a 
shared, universally understood experience.  The phrase “becomes an inclusive and 
difference-erasing shorthand for a long list of ethnic, national, and racial groups” 
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(Gamson, “Identity Movements Self-Destruct” 396).  And yet, at the same time, many 
people who choose to self-identify as “women of color” rejoice in solidarity among the 
common identity while simultaneously celebrating their differences internally within the 
group. 
Identity politics are often considered to be affiliated with assimilationist tactics 
and tend to be misunderstood as essentialist.  According to Valocchi, “Implicit in this 
problematic is the assertion that personal identitis need to be amplified, consolidated, 
extended, or transformed to correspond to the collectiv  identity of the movement” (449).  
Some of the gay marriage movement’s common flaws come from its failure “to make 
connections between the domestic oppression, to which many of us contribute and from 
which many of us benefit” because “people still find t easier to examine and oppose 
oppression elsewhere than to examine privilege and oppression” within their own 
projects (Spade, “Fighting to Win” 51).  Mainstream LGBfakeT organizations, a term 
adopted from Dean Spade, rally for inclusion in institutions of power rather than fight for 
the underlying issues affecting individuals who remain marginalized and below the 
bottom economic layer.   
Not all the effects/attributes of identity politics are negative, and thus the 
possibility of its implementation should continuously be considered while evaluating its 
potential benefits and/or risks; for instance, an argument that is framed within identity 
based language tends to be more widely understood by individuals outside of the 
communities who are engaged in conversations pertaining to theories of gender.  Currah 
recognizes that a liberal rights-based framework ignores the recognition of class which is 
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caused by the conviction that political/legal movements should take “the legal structures 
as we find them, not as they ought to be” (6).  I understand Currah’s statement to imply 
an unwillingness to question the existing legal structures or a misunderstanding of the 
impermanence of the current structures as well as advocates for the potential spaces in 
which movements can be critiqued, evaluated, and exposed to suggestions on how to 
favorably transform current legal structures.   
Cohen also offers insight into the potential of radic l coalition work by stating, 
“Only through recognizing the many manifestations of p wer, across and within 
categories, can we truly begin to build a movement based on one’s politics and not 
exclusively on one’s identity” (“Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens” 459).  
Accompanied by outlining strategies to maintain an integrated analysis, Cohen analyzes 
the benefits and the detriments connected to identity politics.  Cohen questions how 
power informs and constitutes privileged and marginalized subjects (“Punks, 
Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens” 438) by continually bringing the discussion back to 
the assorted levels of power dispersed among queer id ntities, including but not limited to 
race, class, sex, gender, ability, nationality, etc.  By applying queer theory’s intersectional 
analysis to my research, I hope to further understand identity politics and transition the 
strategic conversation from assimilation tactics toward a more leftist political framing in 
the creation of an ethical politics of kinship care. 
I am not only interested in the critique of identity politics; I am also intrigued by 
queering my perspective on the role of identity politics in order to create an ethical 
politics of kinship care: “Recognizing that identity politics takes place at the site where 
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categories intersect thus seems more fruitful than challenging the possibility of talking 
about categories at all” (Crenshaw, “Mapping Margins” 1299).  Due to the limitations of 
kinship terminologies accepted by politics as well as social spheres, how are we settling?  
And in the same breath, how are we progressing? 
Others have pointed to how identity politics impacts the gay rights movement 
and/or kinship discourses (Warner; Mohanty & Wetherell; Gamson; and Crimp).  I see 
my work as adding to these critical scholarly texts.  A different approach to identity 
politics is needed that recognizes the mobilization of identity as a negotiation or “a 
discussion among those in identity groups to put forth an agenda that fully recognizes the 
various political interests, conflicting though they may be, that exist within an identity 
category” (Crenshaw, “Identity Multiculturalism”).  Conceptualizing identity categories 
as coalitions and/or potential for coalitions “by virtue of their internal heterogeneity and 
the tacit or explicit creative acts through which they are organized and represented as 
unified” (Carastathis 945) challenges the single-axis notions of identity politics.  
Intersectionality has often been taken up as a buzzword associated with identity politics 
and critiqued as assimilationist discourse.  Crenshaw’s definition of intersectionality 
rejects the common descriptors of its buzzword counterpart: 
 
It rejects both the declaration of a universal experience of a given vector of harm 
and the notion that people affected by multiple vectors are enduring conditions 
that are simply experiences of single-axis harm added together (Spade, 
“Intersectional Resistance” 1050). 
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I agree with this conceptual understanding of intersectionality.  It further supports my 
claims that universal/essentialist viewpoints are harmful and that people do not 
experience single-issue lives but rather embody multi-faceted and complex realities.  
Since I see all identities as integrated, I do not separate and pull out specific identities 
within disconnected categories such as sexuality versus gender versus race.  Instead, I 
approach my thesis with the understanding of intersectionality’s role in identity politics. 
In order to move towards the full potential of identity politics, it must incorporate 
an intersectional analysis and approach, as evidence  by Cohen’s call for “not necessarily 
abandoning identity politics but building on or working through identity politics” 
(“Movement Doing Politics” 117).  Cohen recommends articulating identity formations 
based on politics or political groupings rather than identity categories of gender, race, 
sex, class, etc.; “Refining our political analysis forces us to reexamine the basis of our 
unity and explore just how far we can proceed with our current political configurations” 
(“Movement Doing Politics” 117).  Crimp believes, “the eradication of homophobia – of 
this already institutionalized ignorance – depends on our collective political struggle, on 
our identity politics” (13).  An ethical politics of kinship care is a prime example of 
building a coalition around the collective political struggle of kinship care policies; its 
political struggle reaches/affects many different identity populations in different ways 
while simultaneously connecting them all on the collective basis of being affected by 
kinship care policies. 
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Negotiating the Political 
This section discloses my interpersonal negotiation of the U.S. government’s 
political and legal involvement with and within kinship care systems.  As you will read, I 
do not provide – or know of – a clear cut-and-dried suggestion for the future of kinship 
politics, but rather I focus on exploring various approaches and their potential outcomes 
by critically analyzing current kinship care ideologies’ implications.  I firmly believe in 
following a left political framework/guide, hence I recommend a critical deconstruction 
of current policies and legal/political governing bodies of power.  I understand this 
deconstructive process to be transformative, coaliti n-based, long-lasting, and 
unpredictable.  It needs to have fluid/flexible phases guided by activists rather than abrupt 
political/legal changes administered by the U.S. government; for example, the 
government can’t effectively shut down one afternoon without people creating – or at 
least being in the process of creating/initiating – new alternatives.  That alternative 
creation must have the support of a significant number of people in order to be 
widespread and successful, be made to encompass all kinship care formations/realities, 
and should include the implementation of legal administrative reforms that protect the 
well-being of all kinship realities. 
As exemplified by the shutdown of the government from October 1st through 16th 
2013, “citizens” of the U.S. rely on their government’s presence to varying degrees with 
situations ranging from a person’s application for a passport to a person’s visit to a 
national forest – both situations were unattainable during the 2013 government shutdown.  
I have mixed/complex feelings about the term “citizens” used in most legislation to 
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denote subjecthood of the specific law/regulation.  “Citizen” has more than one meaning 
and does not entail equal rights for all identified U.S. citizens as many would hope; 
however, for the purpose of this research, it is refer ing to people who are deemed U.S. 
“citizens” by the U.S. government.  The government shutdown was a re ult of Congress’ 
inability to “agree on a spending plan for the fiscal year…as they [Republicans and 
Democrats] wrangled over Obamacare, leaving federal coffers short” (Yan).  Out of the 
225 years of U.S. presidency starting in 1789 with George Washington, the 2013 
disagreement on federal budget and the preceding lack of mutual bipartisan 
understanding caused the 17th government shutdown in the history of the U.S. (Cillizza).  
Furthermore, all 17 government shutdowns have occurred between the years of 1976 to 
2013 (Cillizza), which is only a 37 year time period.  From this information, I find the 
current legal and socio-political setting/climate to be at a critical fulcrum that opens up 
future possibilities including the deconstruction of the seemingly malleable legal systems. 
It is unrealistic to wish away the government’s existence and legal regulations and 
legislation.  Rather, if a “bottom-up” approach to kinship care is applied in legal arenas, 
then we are participating in the deconstruction comp nent of a left political process.  
According to Cohen: 
 
A left framework of politics, unlike civil rights or liberal frameworks, brings into  
focus the systematic relationship among forms of domination, where the creation 
and maintenance of exploited, subservient, marginalized classes is a necessary 
part of, at the very least, the economic configuration (“Punks, Bulldaggers, and 
Welfare Queens” 442). 
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This would include multiple-oppressive frameworks and deconstructive analysis as well, 
both strategies that have not been acknowledged by the gay marriage rights movement as 
of yet.  By “bottom-up,” I am referring to a coalition approach initiated on addressing the 
needs of the most vulnerable populations affected followed by the integration of other, 
(slightly) more privileged populations affected by the given issue. 
Neoliberalism acts as a predatory system against “the radical openness to 
alternative futures” (McRuer).  Within the gay marri ge debate’s neoliberal framework, 
the limiting “pro versus con” discourse disregards the very-real complexities and 
diversities found within LGBTQIA communities.  In the model for the supporting side of 
the gay marriage rights debate, the “pro” discourse centers on marriage rights’ assumed 
benefits for “the” essentialized LGBTQ population without consideration of an 
intersectional analysis or comprehensive alternative; while the “con” discourse among 
these supporters uncritically labels current legislation related to the ban on gay marriage 
as inherently “bad” without regard to the role of the institution of marriage.  Supporters 
of gay marriage rights center their debate on assimilat on into dominant hierarchies by re-
codifying traditional kinship views rather than deconstructing the structural institution of 
marriage.  The marriage equality debate locates the idea of legally-recognized gay 
families as structural effects of heterosexual institutions (Shapiro 1) – viz. the marriage 
equality movement mimics the heterosexist, racist, and classist foundations that constitute 
the institution of marriage.  In the beginning of Chapter II, I return to this claim of the 
institution of marriage’s oppressive foundations in more depth. 
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 The equal marriage rights agenda can be harmful – and in my opinion, is harmful, 
– due to its assimilation tactics coinciding.  In order to assimilate into an existent 
institution for “same/equal” rights such as marriage, the movement is forced to focus on 
and affirm the socio-political institution of marriage as inherently “good” in an attempt to 
demonstrate the movement’s desire for assimilation as valid.  That is to say in order to 
assimilate into an existing institution, you must desire that institution’s current status of 
legal “benefits” for yourself and/or group; thus, qualifying those “benefits” and legal 
proceedings as inherently good and/or desirable.  I use the word inherently here because 
if you didn’t consider the institution’s current “benefits” as good or desirable, then you 
wouldn’t want to assimilate into them; rather, you would choose an alternative approach 
to addressing the specific issue you hope to advocate for.  Alternatively, if you do have 
criticisms of an institution’s established “benefit” but/and also feel that the current state 
of things related to your issue are not acceptable, then, queering your approach to social 
justice activism is the most effective/efficient opti n; examples of a queer approach 
include deconstructing the existing regulation to create something more comprehensively 
equitable in its place, or finding another alternative actic such as considering the 
emancipation of legal control over the subject/issue. 
By trying to assimilate into the institution of marri ge, no one is questioning the 
harms and discrimination that result from that institution; nor does it leave room for 
critical engagement, discussions, or criticisms.  For instance, advocating for marriage 
equality does not address the issue of someone’s employ ent lacking health care benefit 
plans – it actually justifies that the current health care institution and its exclusionary 
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practices is correct on the basis of how the marriage equality movement neglects to 
engage in a critical analysis.  Marriage excludes many “legions of people – straight and 
gay, bisexual or transgendered, and others – whose lives are intertwined in ways that do 
not fit with one-size-fits-all marriage” (Duggan).  By focusing only on one issue, the 
realistic matrices of oppression are blurred in order to justify a single origination source; 
“The focus on access to marriage may be constricting the imagination of advocates for 
LGBT families who attribute every problem a same-sex couple experiences to marriage 
discrimination” (Polikoff, Introduction 8).  Do you really want to lift up marriage as a 
“good” institution?  Do you want to support it without creating critical space to name its 
exclusionary policies and its narrow definition of kinship care?  Consequent to the single-
issue framework of assimilating into marriage and therefore (implicitly) disregarding 
other forms of kinship care as disposable or not as worthy of legal recognition, do you 
want to actively participate in creating/reiterating the legal protections of marriage as the 
only “good/intelligible” kinship care relation within a hierarchal structure that demonizes 
people choosing more legally vulnerable kin alternatives/relations?  These rhetorical and 
polemic questions are intended to conceptually prepare you for my deconstruction of the 
gay marriage rights movement while also engaging in a more comprehensive undertaking 
that creates an ethical politics of kinship care though coalition building. 
I am interested in the concept of moving past the current U.S. rights-based 
strategies that fight/advocate for certain single-issue political/social/economic justices.  
For some people, this possibility might alter the ways in which they understand the U.S.’s 
role within political decisions affecting themselves as well as others.  It will also disrupt 
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the neoliberal framework behind “human rights” legislation.  The discourse concerning 
human rights often serves as a façade eluding any seriou  form of inquiry on the 
legislative context and socio-political power disparities in which “human rights" are often 
applied.  Although human rights are considered to be universal in context, the level of 
access and the amount of granted acceptance relies greatly on the governance of the 
sovereign state and its given position within the global hierarchy of nations (Asad).  
Applying the phrase “human rights” can be an insufficient strategy in advocating for 
legal protection of the welfare for all humans – viz. the U.S.’s version of “human rights” 
frequently does not apply to or cover the rights for immigrant/migrant humans. 
Within political and legal arenas, discussions concer ing kinship can either 
approach or resist current U.S. policies.  Kirsch poses a central question while 
considering how to interact with U.S. policies: “Isit possible that we [queer activists] are 
foreshadowing disappointment by working within the framework of accepted political 
norms?” (17).  I believe the answer to this question (as it applies to my analysis on the 
gay marriage rights movement) is yes.  Disposable populations fall through the cracks 
and are made even more vulnerable through a deficiency of rights protecting their well-
beings; the current institution of marriage is producing disposable persons by not 
recognizing all forms of kinship care and therefore not legally protecting the well-being 
of all individuals. 
We cannot simply add “marriage equality” to the legal agenda in hopes that it will 
foundationally change the oppression faced by many vulnerable groups within and 
outside of LGBTQAI communities.  The additive model oes not address the structural 
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institutions and other dominating oppressive frameworks that work to produce disposable 
people or marginalized groups.  Some inequities that are not addressed through “access to 
the state-regulated institution of marriage” include “full equality, universal health care, or 
expansively reimagined forms of kinship that reflect our actual lives” (Duggan).  For 
example, the fact that not all employees (which in and of itself fails to address 
unemployment) are awarded health care is often a nonexistent issue within gay marriage 
equality discussions; “They fight for people who are employed to be able to get their 
partners on their private health coverage, but takeno stand on Medicaid and do nothing to 
promote universal healthcare” (Spade, “Fighting to Win” 51).  The mainstream gay 
agenda has fixated itself upon advancing the movement for marriage equality; and in the 
process, has neglected the entirety of the LGBTQAI population, some of whose needs 
consist of more economic and socially equitable priorities. 
My suggestions for the future resist an assimilationist political approach and 
instead are grounded within a decolonized framework.  Andrea Smith specifies that 
decolonization strategies “should not be premised on the notion that the U.S. should or 
will always continue to exist” (51); meaning that current legislation/institutions are not 
static and have the potential to be deconstructed and tr nsformed to better embody 
everyone’s well-being.  However, it is important to keep in mind that any “analyses that 
we choose to pursue are a reflection of our relationship to this dominant economic nexus 
[capitalism] and our willingness or refusal to oppose it or deny its presence” (Kirsch 18).  
Even when starting from a decolonized perspective, we can never be removed from our 
relation to or position within colonialism, capitalsm, and/or other dominant systems.  
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The first step is to acknowledge the historical location in which we find ourselves in 
hopes to better understand the complex and multi-faceted spaces in need of further socio-
political navigation; for instance, the understanding of socio-political spaces that are 
capable of – but are not currently – protecting all kinship care formations.
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CHAPTER II 
  
WHY MARRIAGE 
 
 
From these social movements, we understand marriage as a technology of social 
control, exploitation, and dispossession wrapped in a stain ribbon of sexist and 
heteropatriarchal romance mythology (Spade & Willse, “Marriage Will Never Set 
Us Free”). 
 
 
Where is kinship care recognized?  How does politica  policy regarding kinship 
impact social conditions (such as economic distribuion or health care)?  How are kinship 
laws censored, regulated, and made intelligible?  Who is affected – and in what ways – 
by kinship?  How are court cases taken up in the media and/or by organizations; and 
what’s lost when this happens?  How do legal cases ff ct different areas of public spaces 
after a decision has been made? 
To cover the large scope of people impacted by the vast spectrum of issues related 
to kinship care would be too large of a task for a single thesis paper.  In this chapter, I use 
a legal case as a pivotal point that explicates/supports my vision for a future ethical 
politics of kinship care by recognizing the shortcomings of the court’s decision as well as 
connects how the existence of other kinship formations are neglected by the case’s 
legislative results.  Although I suggest building a coalition among the numerous groups 
of people affected by the multi-faceted issues of kinship care in order to create an ethical 
politics of kinship care, this thesis will only concentrate on one particular issue within 
kinship care systems – marriage rights.  I want to make clear that I see marriage as a 
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social institution regulated by legal and socio-political frameworks.  Since “gay 
marriage” has been a hotly contested topic for decas in the U.S., it is a sound focus for 
this thesis.  Furthermore, research on the gay marriage ights movement is also a 
reasonable place of origin for a more comprehensive line of inquiry/research into my 
concept of coalition building which is crucial for future projects of an ethical politics of 
kinship care. 
Since academic climate and political media conversations regarding the gay 
marriage debate prompted my primary research for the thesis, I feel it is important to 
keep this legal system of kinship care as the main jumping off point in examining the 
potential for an ethical politics of kinship care.  According to Willse, “this requires 
developing a politics that sees the importance of lgal battles such as this one and also 
sees the costs of a liberal model of politics represented in this fight” (“Ban Marriage”).  I 
explore how political policies regarding kinship has impacted the cultural/social climate 
and conditions surrounding the LGBTQIA community, how U.S. v. Windsor specifically 
has become intelligible to the general public via media’s censorship/regulations of the 
case law, and who is affected – and in what ways – by kinship policies.  I will also focus 
on the limiting ways that specific usages and assumptions of kinship are taken up within 
political and case law to affect nationalist economic agendas and socio-economic 
projects.  To demonstrate the left political agenda that my thesis suggests, I refer to the 
methodology used by Paisley Currah.  In his “Gender Plu alisms” article, he outlines 
potential opportunities to build coalitions by political connection and intersectionality.  
Unlike Currah’s article, the close proximity of writing this thesis with the court’s decision 
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in the U.S. v. Windsor case prevents me from recording any long-term outcomes/effects 
which are not yet known. 
In looking at who is affected by U.S. v. Windsor and in what ways, it is beneficial 
to analyze/examine how identity politics have been taken up in the gay marriage rights 
movement.  Gamson poses an important question regardin  targeted populations to be 
included and to be excluded: “for whom, when, and how are stable collective identities 
necessary for social action and social change?” (“Queer Dilemma” 403).  In relation to 
kinship care policies, we should consider Gamson’s question from two perspectives.  The 
first perspective pertains to asking the questions of who is the subject of the policy, who 
is left out, who creates such policies, and in what w ys are these policies carried out.  The 
second portion to consider is who we envision an ethical politics of kinship care to 
include and how could it be implemented in such a way that maintains its aim to be 
comprehensive, intersectional, leftist, and transformational. 
In recent years, an increasing number of critiques of the gay marriage debate have 
surfaced.  The “gay marriage debate” has engulfed th  consciousness of what has become 
known as the mainstream gay movement (primarily shaped by white, middle- to upper- 
class, U.S. American citizens).  It promotes a faulty impression that there exists a 
collective identity – the LGBTQIA identity – that is not affected or impacted by the 
intersectionality of other identity categories and/or lived experiences.  Being mindful of 
identity politics is important while exploring U.S. v. Windsor in greater detail, 
specifically noting how Windsor’s identity is taken up and/or portrayed in mainstream 
media.  The mainstream movement’s lack of inclusion for the rest of the LGBTQIA 
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communities is made apparent by its agenda’s disregard for political/legal/economic 
injustices and inequities that disproportionately affect vulnerable groups within 
LGBTQIA communities.  Who is left out and excluded in the movement’s agenda for 
assimilation?  Kinship care systems do not only include romantic, monogamous couples 
who wish to participate in the institution of marrige; so therefore, a lot of people who do 
not have the goal of marriage but rather are involved in other forms of kinship care are 
excluded or left out of the mainstream movement’s plan of marriage assimilation.    
It is important to be cognizant of the history behind the institution of marriage in 
the U.S.  In this section, a brief historical overvi w of the institution of marriage 
foreshadows the accounts of inequities overlooked by the “gay marriage debate” (e.g. 
unequal access to health care and employee benefits).  In looking at its historical timeline, 
the status of marriage “as a tr dition ties its current meaning to its past” (Chambers 128); 
this is an intriguing and compound idea that maintains two opposing thoughts or feelings 
wholly and simultaneously.  On the one side, even institutions that have tried to take on 
contemporary concepts are still largely connected to their historical background based on 
the very notion of tradition – the basis of the validation of its institutional existence in 
modern times; and, at the same time, the very notio of tradition – being a part of the past 
– is often used to dismiss any past oppressive implications from contemporary times as if 
to say the institution has the magical power to disassociate its origins from its current 
statute.  Scholars set up their discussion on contemporary issues of “the gay marriage 
debate” in a particular way in order to invoke a historical and cultural life of marriage.  
I’m looking both in terms of the past legal and social atmospheres as well as predicting 
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future outcomes of the political marriage debate in order to demonstrate the historical 
significance the past plays and the significant impact the future can hold. 
Chandan Reddy focuses on how liberal motives/values cannot be regarded as 
separate from the important role they play in promoting and maintaining the nation-state.  
An example of a liberal value is the validation for the military through assimilationist 
agenda of military inclusion on the basis of creating egalitarianism; the significance of 
the liberal agenda on the level of equality or “all-inclusion” within the military 
authenticates the very existence of the military as a “good” institution and does not intend 
to critically engage in a critique of the militaries’ institution nor does it suggest any 
alternatives for war reform.  Reddy calls for an alternative approach in understanding the 
relationships among sexuality, race, and gender that include intersectionality and 
historical backgrounds; for example, “sexual equality cannot lose its own shadows of 
racial struggles against the systemic disposability that defined the limits of the Civil 
Rights Act” (“Freedom’s Amendments” 17).  In this example, Reddy is referencing how 
the racial tensions and racist implications from the feminist movement for sexual equality 
during the 1960’s to 80’s, which is commonly referred to as the “Second Wave,” cannot 
be forgotten or removed from contemporary feminist movements.  Reddy also 
importantly uses the term “disposability” to connect to the effectual limitations of a 
rights-based movement, an idea that I explore further and more in-depth at the end of 
Chapter III. 
Reddy’s proposal to frame political struggles in terms of amendments – 
amendments are legal modifications to current state and federal legislation – instead of 
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“intersections” allows for an alternative historical hindsight.  As discussed in Chapter I, 
an intersectional approach frames the political struggle in terms of coalitions and identity 
politics within a multi-faceted intersectional analysis.  I believe implementing both 
approaches of amendments as well as intersectionality is imperative.  There needs to be a 
mixture of both applications in the creation of an ethical politics of kinship care in order 
to reap the benefits from both approaches while limiting the shortcomings apparent in 
each of the approaches.  I believe “amendment” was cho en purposefully by Reddy in 
order to play on the term’s multiple meanings related to political terminologies and 
verbal transformation.  By understanding political modernity through amendments, “the 
discursive and historical formations or bodies thate amendment reanimates and keeps 
alive continually exceed its framing” (Reddy, “Freedom’s Amendments” 17).  Unlike the 
concept of an intersectional model which has the pot ntial to combat identity politics’ 
essentialist references, looking at issues through the legal sphere of amendments allows 
for an additional perspective on the topic including both its past significance as well as 
any future implications.  Likewise, only looking at a political issue through amendments 
could potentially overlook current/contemporary matrices of domination that reiterate 
certain norms not historically relevant. 
A panel of three scholars held at the New College of California in 2004 
importantly attempted to answer the anticipated question of whether or not marriage can 
be disassociated from its damaging past by looking at it within queer politics.  The three 
speakers – and I agree with them full-heartedly – believe that the institution of marriage 
cannot be removed from its historical past or its contemporary implications.  As stated by 
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Marlon Bailey, “Not everybody’s relationship to the state is the same; therefore, people’s 
different investments in same-sex marriage or lack thereof should be discussed” (88).  In 
other words, along with the undertaking of marriage within a historical/amendment 
approach, there also needs to be an intersectional approach in order to account for the 
modern lived experiences of people’s relationships with one another, themselves, and the 
state.  The panel remarks on the tragic reality of how African Americans have not been 
embraced within U.S. legislation; particularly exemplified by the pathologization of 
Black families as demonstrated by excessive police force used to terrorize neighborhoods 
of Black communities along with a disproportionate number of incarcerated African 
Americans within the prison system (Bailey).  Marrige has also played a role in anti-
Black racism due to the institution of marriage’s racist history as well as current 
legislation’s classist and heteronormative undertones.  For example, President Obama’s 
“Health Marriage Promotion initiatives have been used to encourage low-income women 
to marry, including at times through cash incentives” (Spade and Willse, “Marriage 
Never Free”).  This example highlights how a governme tal strategy that advertises the 
conformance towards social normatives/narratives of marriage in order to obtain 
supplementary – and often necessary – resources to a certain group of people based on 
class further personifies the neoliberal concept of pulling oneself up by their bootstraps; 
in other words, if a low-income woman don’t choose to marry in order to obtain that cash 
incentive, then it is her fault for not taking every possible “opportunity” for success.  This 
whole idea/example is ludicrous.  Instead of analyzing the dominating systems of 
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oppression that divide levels of class, the governmt creates incentives for low-income 
women to marry in order to have financial assistance. 
Researching marriage rights using legislative amendents exposes marriage as an 
institution rooted in racism, classism and sexism.  In 1691, Virginia law banned all forms 
of interracial marriage (Stoler 41).  More than 200 years later during the 1967 Loving v. 
Virginia ruling, a Virginia statute finally removed the ban gainst “mix-raced marriages” 
(Eng 37).  During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuri s, U.S. slave codes banned 
imprisoned slaves from legal marriage (Cohen 453).  As stated by Stoler, “colonial 
authority in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was secured through a pervasive 
system of political and familial alliance” (42).  Considering the institution of marriage’s 
historically horrific origins/meanings, what are the reasons to support it or assimilate into 
it? 
By having assimilation as the goal, “queer liberalism extends the right of privacy 
to gay and lesbian U.S. citizen-subjects willing to comply with its normative dictates of 
bourgeois intimacy, and able to afford the comforts f bourgeois domesticity in their 
reconfigured globalized incarnations” (Eng, Feelings of Kinship 45).  This statement 
directly connects with my interventions previously mentioned.  The first connection is 
how the statement uses “liberalism” to refer to the lib ral motives/values I examined 
earlier in this chapter as well as its contribution t  the creation of neoliberalism.  
Secondly, the statement outstandingly mentions “U.S. citizen-subjects” which further 
demonstrates my point that nationalist agendas are directly tied into the continuation of 
the institution of marriage.  In line with my own uderstandings, Eng’s statement also 
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expresses how norms are produced through compliance as well as comments on classist 
undertones of the issue supported by an intersectional analysis.  The notion of 
“reconfigured globalized incarnations” will be revisited later in this chapter when I 
discuss the impact of gay marriage rights on immigrat on law. 
My attention to marriage legislation, specifically gay marriage rights, offers 
insight into some of the complexities existent in ki ship care systems.  These 
complexities refer to the convoluted agendas and strategies enforced by (usually) well-
intentioned organizations in the name of “marriage equality” and to the modern-day 
pluralistic effects as well as future hidden implicat ons that gay marriage legislation and 
its supportive movements have on all the varying formations of kinship care.  As 
specified by Spade and Willse: 
 
The idea that same-sex marriage advocacy is a fight for the ‘freedom to marry’ or 
‘equality’ is absurd since the existence of legal mrriage is a form of coercive 
regulation in which achieving or not achieving marital status is linked to 
accessing vital life resources like health care and paths to legalized immigration 
(“Marriage Never Free”).   
 
 
Instead of recognizing these complexities and pluralities, the mainstream gay marriage 
rights movement takes up a single-oppression framework hich leaves out a portion of 
the LGBTQIA community and ignores the multiple-oppressive structures that situate 
vulnerable populations.  Single-oppression frameworks including the one used in the gay 
marriage debate fail to understand the intersectionality and pluralisms found within 
systems of power.  Where is the discussion and recogniti n of class differences within the 
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mainstream gay marriage debate?  It is silenced through the strategic approach of single-
oppression frameworks. 
The gay marriage rights movement is based on a “middle-up” class strategy, 
rather than a “bottom-up” approach – remember that “bottom-up” strategies are most 
desirable since they start with the issues affecting the most vulnerable individuals and 
more effectively lead to transformative socio-political justice by limiting the foundations 
of oppressive systems, and thus increasing the number of people helped.  We need to be 
looking at the core populations hit hardest by kinsh p policies, including legislative 
policies on rights affiliated with the act of legalized marriage.  The gay marriage rights 
movement needs to reflect on ways in which it is oppressive to others; specifically 
reflecting on the privileged assumption that marriage equality is the top priority for all, 
when in reality equitable resource distribution is one of the primary goals for people who 
are marginalized in more than one aspect of their id ntity categories.  Even though 
LGBTQIA communities are considered to be a marginalized population, additional 
considerations need to be implemented on how the intersections of race, income, ability, 
and gender further affect individuals in these communities; i.e., couples whose 
employment does not grant any type of health insurance (married or not) are not affected 
by marriage rights regarding healthcare insurance plans, single individuals whose 
immigration status is now dependent upon whether they find a U.S. citizen to marry, and 
so on.  However, I do understand that marriage rights are a goal for some LGBTQIA 
couples and therefore must be taken into account while creating an ethical politics of 
kinship care; but marriage should not be the end-all-be-all political answer.  If the gay 
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marriage rights movement deconstructed the multi-faceted forms of institutional 
oppressions, then marriage equality could follow – and might have a stronger chance of – 
concrete legal, political, social, and economic change. 
U.S. v. Windsor Case Summary 
U.S. v. Windsor case’s decision overturned Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA) in 2013.  Section 3 of DOMA states that, “the word ‘marriage’ means only 
a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 
‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife” (Banks 
and Smolla).  In order to understand kinship ideologies, I analyze the U.S. v. Windsor 
case that recognized a legal kinship bond through making gay marriage intelligible 
through legal reformation. 
In 1996, President Clinton passed DOMA which deemed arriage as a 
fortification of state sovereignty (Helfman 19).  DOMA defined marriage within federal 
law as “a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife” and 
determined that “no state is obligated to recognize same-sex marriages performed in 
another state” (Helfman 19).  Prior to DOMA, the federal government relied on rights 
and legislation concerning marriage at the state-lev l due to the locality between state 
government officials and their constituents: “political authority that is closest to the 
family and most representative of the community values animating marriage as an 
institution” (Helfman 19).  According to the House, DOMA expressed “moral 
disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction hat heterosexuality better 
comports with traditional morality” (Gray). 
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Furthermore, “DOMA may well be the first occasion fr a familial definition 
offered by Congress to come into direct conflict with the definitions states are adopting” 
(Helfman 21).  Many national gay-rights leaders predict an outburst of state-by-state 
lawsuits “seeking to expand gay marriage rights…bring the issue back to the Supreme 
Court in a quest for a ruling that would establish a 50-state policy” (Crary) as a result of 
the U.S. v. Windsor case rulings.  These national gay-rights organizations believe U.S. v. 
Windsor to be a pivotal point for success in the near-future of marriage legislation/rights. 
 
Under DOMA, same-sex married couples have their lives burdened, by reason of 
government decree, in visible and public ways. By its great reach, DOMA touches 
many aspects of married and family life, from the mundane to the profound. It 
prevents same-sex married couples from obtaining government healthcare 
benefits they would otherwise receive (Banks and Smolla). 
 
 
The above quote locates the featured feelings among ost gay marriage rights activists 
concerning how DOMA impacted same-sex married couples rior to the U.S. v. Windsor 
case.  So as you could deduce, the case’s success of abolishing DOMA’s Section 3 was 
considered to be a major triumph.  Keeping in mind this example of the current social 
climate surrounding the case, I will now provide a summary of the case, any historical 
relevance to the case’s subjects, as well as an overview of how the case has been publicly 
represented within mainstream channels.  
In 2009, New York citizen, Edith Windsor, sued the U.S. government for a refund 
of an estate tax bill totaling $363,053 that was charged on the property inheritance left for 
her after the death of her partner, Thea Clara Spyer.  L gally married in Canada, the 
couple had celebrated 40 years together before Spyer’s passing.  The state of New York 
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recognized their marriage union under New York’s Marriage Equality Act; however, the 
union was not federally recognized due to DOMA, and therefore the estate tax was not 
covered under federal law that declares “married people can leave an unlimited amount 
of assets to their spouses” (Nather) without being taxed.  In addition to having an estate 
tax bill that could even total a sum as expensive as $363,053, having the financial ability 
to pay such a large bill prior to suing the U.S. federal government for a refund are both 
indicative of Edith Windsor’s privileged class status.   
Bearing in mind Reddy’s definition of amendments, Windsor’s case has been 
taken up in a particular way by mainstream media as to ignore the racist implications and 
historical foundations surrounding the topic of legal marriage.  Reddy poses an important 
question to apply to the issue of marriage: “What were the epistemological means for 
conveying this transition to ordinariness and acceptance in our changed political 
circumstances?” (“Freedom’s Amendments” 5).  Supporters of equal marriage rights 
deemed marriage as ordinary and normalized which, in turn, further separates the idea of 
“the other” or alternative kinship ideologies.  Marri ge rights also “abstract and idealize 
the acts passed by Congress, rather than seeing them as mediations of specific social and 
historical conditions” (Reddy, “Freedom’s Amendments” 9-10).  The court’s decision on 
U.S. v. Windsor effectively introduced federal marriage rights to gay or same-sex married 
couples for the first time in history.  Although this statement appears to be a positive 
indication of marriage, also assessing marriage basd on its historical amendments is 
necessary. 
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Many marriage rights are often classist or class-based, similar to the example of 
Windsor’s inheritance estate tax.  As for estate tax benefits, legal marriage doesn’t 
require spouses to pay large estate taxes after their significant other’s death but “only 
affects same-sex couples who are wealthy enough to have a lot of assets” (Nather).  As a 
result of the case, same-sex married couples now can have a tax break for workplace 
health coverage, which is dependent on whether or not their current job offers health care 
coverage.  Social Security benefits are also available for legally married couples, 
however “the way the benefits are calculated, a two-inc me couple gets higher payments 
than single people, but not as high as a couple where only one person worked” (Nather).  
A couple whose financial stability only requires/depends on one income has a wealthy 
and privileged standpoint.  This one-income marriage lso has greater tax benefits.  
Federal tax bills depend on the joint income of a married couple – couples will have 
“lower tax bills if there’s a big gap in their incomes” (Nather).  On the other hand, if both 
spouses have similar incomes, then they “won’t get all of the tax breaks that they could 
have gotten if they’d filed individually” (Nather).  This summary of how tax benefits are 
distributed based on the case decision is very telling in how marriage reiterates classist 
hierarchies.  Coming from a marriage that can be financially stable on a single income is 
a privileged position; whereas, most marriages in low- to middle- income families often 
rely on the dual income of both married partners to ustain themselves and/or survive.  
The New Yorker’s “The Perfect Wife” article is a great example of h w 
mainstream media portrays Windsor using a narrative of neoliberal progress focused on a 
white, wealthy elderly socialite woman.  Her relationship with her spouse Spyer - “who 
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came from a wealthy family in Holland, spoke Dutch, played the violin beautifully and 
had been thrown out of Sarah Lawrence for kissing a woman” (Gray) – is portrayed 
within heteronormative gender norms. The article focused on her love story with Spyer 
and how she won a monumental “landmark case for gay marriage” (Levy). The goal of 
the article was to create compassion around the love story and to establish the couple’s 
normalcy among other heterosexual couples. 
To further create compassion around same-sex love st ri , Windsor implies how 
Republicans who previously opposed gay marriage come t  accept it based on the idea 
that everyone knows (or will soon enough know) a gay person, and therefore, will 
innately have compassion for all LGBTQ individuals.  Her answer to why individuals 
against gay marriage later decide to support it after a loved one comes out as gay 
specifically focused on republicans: “That’s how everybody who’s not gay decides to 
support gay marriage. They discover that somebody the  know and love is gay, and they 
say, ‘Oh, Jesus, I had no idea’” (Goldman).  I find this compounded idea hard to believe 
considering the harsh and sad realities faced by numerous LGBTQ individuals whose 
biological kin have disowned them or worse for “coming out” as any category, variation, 
or non-abbreviated form of LGBTQAI.  Windsor gives an example of her own 
compassion for Bill Clinton when she forgave him for signing DOMA; this political 
reference with the concept of compassion implicitly opens up a window of opportunity to 
nonchalantly add in a few remarks about compassionate Republicans.  When asked about 
what she thought about Bill Clinton signing DOMA into law, she answered, “Hated it. I 
hated him. I would trust no Clinton anywhere any time” (Goldman).  However, when 
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asked about how she currently felt about Clinton, she responded with non-hateful 
forgiveness for the mistake of passing DOMA – which she believes Clinton now regrets 
and has learned from.   
In The New York Times interview, Windsor refers to herself as a “middle-c ass 
woman in New York” and compares her subjective exploration of being gay with her 
experience in graduate school which also indicates educational privilege.  Responding to 
the question regarding what her plans were if her legal case won in court, she replies, “I 
want to have a street party, that’s all I know. I am going to be one of the grand marshals 
in the gay-pride parade.”  This further complicates the implications of a white, rich, 
gender-normative, apolitical woman living in New York City’s wealthy neighborhood 
being the poster child for gay rights.  Also, it is important to acknowledge Windsor’s 
previous quote portraying the case’s decision as a win for a generalized understanding of 
“gay rights” versus the actual case’s focus on gay m rriage rights.  Gay rights isn’t 
synonymous with the marriage debate, since the gay marriage rights movement neglects a 
large portion of vulnerable groups in LGBTQIA communities and ignores a 
comprehensive outlook on the political issues at hand regarding gay rights.  Also, 
viewing gay rights as pertaining only to gay marriage legislation depoliticizes marriage as 
a personal choice rather than part of politics.  This is very telling of how she positions 
herself within “the gay marriage debate.”   
Windsor sees herself as a key leader in “the gay marriage debate” rather than as 
an individual within a broader/greater scope of the LGBTQIA community – or any other 
community for that matter.  In particular, I found her answer to the question of whether or 
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not she considered herself a feminist quite interesing; her response, “Not really” 
(Goldman).  While I understand that not all feminists promote gay marriage and not all 
proponents of gay marriage consider themselves as feminists, her strong stance on the 
issue is worth noting.  I believe her stance implicitly denies the feminist concept of the 
personal is political and further depoliticizes gay marriage as personal but not political.  
Windsor stated that she wouldn’t be a part of NOW due to the organization’s separatist 
ideas between men and women (Goldman,) yet she admitte  to separating herself from 
drag queens and other identities within the LGBTQIA community (Gray) that are often 
portrayed as deviant.  Her distinction between who or what types of identities should be 
separated and which ones should be considered on a c llective platform is very 
important.  However, Windsor believes that the Stonewall Riots along with the lesbian 
response to nurse the gay men in the 1980s AIDS crisis both brought the LGBTQIA 
community together.  I think that the Stonewall Riots is an example of a once-contested 
historical event that has become to be known as an appropriate example of “fighting for” 
civil rights or the “good for humanity”; and I think her reference to the lesbian response 
to the AIDS crisis is consistent with neoliberals’ nationalist savior complex that rewards 
neoliberals as saviors to seemingly incapable “others.”   
In addition to Windsor’s own high self-regard as a le der of the gay right 
movement, the media also frames her as “an icon of the gay-rights movement” by 
revealing Windsor’s leadership roles “at different points in her life” while softening her 
reputation with sociable features such as “feisty, funny and extroverted” (Gray).  In 
Gray’s article, the examples of her past leadership roles include being vice-president of 
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8th grade and her position as a computer programmer “managing (at times reluctant) 
men” (Gray).  Neither of which involve the LGTQIA community, marriage, legislation, 
kinship, or anything else regarding the supposed reason she was nominated as TIME’s 
“Person of the Year” for 2013.  Gray’s article also references Windsor’s sworn affidavit 
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York stating, “I certainly 
didn’t want to be a ‘queer.’ Instead, I wanted to live a ‘normal’ life”.  This statement 
relates back to the previously mentioned distinction Windsor made to separate her from 
drag queens; and thus, reinsuring the public that her ultimate goal was to be “normal” 
which could be accessed via assimilation strategies.  As imilation strategies speak to 
Reddy’s concept of amendments; the institution of marriage being founded in racist 
strategies to normalize societal behavior. 
Edith Windsor is the runner-up for TIME’s 2013 “Person of the Year” Magazine 
edition, more specifically she is ranked as the 3rd most influential/impactful person in 
2013.  According to TIME’s official webpage: 
 
TIME's Person of the Year is bestowed by the editors on the person or persons 
who most affected the news and our lives, for good r ill, and embodied what was 
important about the year. See who made the grade over TIME's first eight decades 
(TIME). 
 
 
To put this nomination into context, TIME’s 2012 “Person of the Year” winner was 
President Obama.  There are serious implications coveyed by nominating both Windsor 
and the U.S. president for the same title (although different years.)  TIME further 
announces her as “the matriarch of the gay-rights move ent” and describes her gay 
 
50 
sexual identity previous to 2009 as “low-profile” – whatever that may mean, one can only 
speculate – until she was “triggered… to fight for her rights in the U.S. Supreme Court” 
(Gray).  The preceding statement captures how TIME portrays Windsor as being a “low-
profile” – i.e., ordinary, modest, restrained, and subdued – U.S. citizen who “fights” for 
“her rights in the U.S. Supreme Court;” selecting the verb “to fight” signifies her as a 
hero, while the latter phrase binds the existence/narration of “[human] rights” with the 
authorization from the U.S. Supreme Court systems.  I plicitly, this demonizes many 
grassroots strategies used for political forms of activism; for instance, queer organizations 
tend to advocate for the elimination/deconstruction of certain legal structures instead of 
asking for the government to edit (add/delete) an exist nt legal structure.  These types of 
activism are devalued by discourse concerning the fight or rights similar to TIME’s 
reference.  This next sentence, found later in the article, concerning Windsor’s reaction to 
the estate tax bill is also very telling: “Furious, Windsor did what so many other ordinary 
gay people in her generation had been forced to do in response to adversity: she decided 
to fight” (Gray).  Please note TIME’s choices to use the following words and phrases: 
“ordinary gay people,” “forced…in response to,” “adversity,” and “to fight.”  There are 
an endless list of implications both explicit and implicit resulting from this statement.  To 
address them all would be too much for this project, instead I want to emphasize how 
ridiculous this statement can be understood when you lo k at the choices of 
words/phrases that I listed. 
Furthermore, the title of the TIME article “Edith Windsor, The Unlikely Activist” 
is of equal interest to me.  Out of all potential ttles, why choose “unlikely activist”?  Is 
 
51 
she “unlikely” because of her sexuality, gender, class, race, age, etc.?  Is she an unlikely 
activist because activists are unjustly assumed to be civil-deviants, unruly, disorderly, 
etc.?  Windsor identifies and is portrayed as “apolitical” referencing the possible 
connotation of what TIME means by “unlikely.”  She is constantly exemplified as a 
“good gay” by following gender-normativity in relationship roles and being apolitical.  
TIME fleetingly mentions her relation to the activist label: “Though she had always been 
quietly supportive in the gay community, generous with her time and money, she had not 
been—in the most literal meaning of the word—an activist” (Gray).  The most intriguing 
and neglected statement in the whole article was momentarily listed as if it was void of 
significance while switching the sentence’s focus to another aspect of the case: 
 
After gay-rights organizations turned her down—they worried, among other 
things, that she was too privileged to serve as the fac  of an important case—she 
connected with Roberta Kaplan, a lesbian and corporate litigator at Paul, Weiss, 
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, who had argued in favor of gay marriage before 
New York’s highest court (Gray). 
 
 
I feel that the fact that she was turned down by “gay-rights organizations” – conveyed by 
generalizing/essentializing the category of gay rights with ambiguousness – for reasons 
regarding her overtly- privileged position should be expanded upon in greater detail, with 
more specifics and critically engaged discussion.  This article also leaves out one of the 
key members of Windsor’s legal counsel, James Esseks, who is the Director of the LGBT 
project at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).   
TIME’s article describes Windsor and Spyer’s residential home to be a “modest 
Greenwich Village apartment” and further describes the spouses as an “upwardly mobile 
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professional couple” reiterating their higher class status (Gray); I think the first quote to 
be a contradictive analogy considering Greenwich Village’s reputation of housing upper-
middle to upper class families.  Spyer and Windsor’s marriage announcement was 
published in The New York Times, a luxury not afforded to most couples nor desired 
among all LGBTQIA individuals.  Windsor’s Manhattan location in a “cleaned-up” part 
of the city is very symbolic of the gentrification f mainstream organizations that 
overwrite the work of many queer organizations.  New York City has become a global 
center for gay politics in many ways starting with the Stonewall rebellion in 1969.  
According to Spade: 
 
In the very neighborhood where the Stonewall Inn is located, a coalition of gay 
and straight high-income renters and home owners have teamed up to rid their 
streets (their group is literally called RID, Residents in Distress) of the queer and 
trans youth of color who have found each other and formed community in the 
public spaces of that neighborhood for years (“Fighting to Win” 48). 
 
 
The regression of inclusivity between 1969 and 2014 seems to be correlated to the 
regression of the mainstream gay agenda.  Both of te queer/radical groups in Chapter IV 
are located in New York City.  Although my thesis is not focused on geographical 
location, I still think the centralized focus in New York City on both national and local 
level LGBTQ groups/organizations is interesting to note. 
The most significant quote from Windsor regarding the significant motivation 
behind her purpose of fighting for marriage was in her interview during March 21, 2013 
on a special edition of NPR’s All Things Considered.  The following excerpt stated by 
Windsor is important and therefore needs to be portrayed in its entirety: 
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The fact is - you know, marriage is this magic thing.  I mean, forget all the 
financial stuff.  Marriage symbolizes commitment and love, like nothing else in 
the world.  And it's known all over the world.  I mean, wherever you go, if you're 
married, that means something to people.  And it meant - the difference in feeling, 
the next day, was profound.  And I've asked everybod  since, who gets married 
after long-term relationships, did it feel different the next day?  And the answer is 
always yes, absolutely (Totenberg). 
 
 
I hope you get the idea of how mainstream media uses U.S. v. Windsor as a mode of 
normalizing and rewarding marriage. 
Aftermath of the Case 
Even though the legal case is chiefly about DOMA and the media portrayal of 
Windsor is chiefly centered in regards to the marriage debate, it is important to 
acknowledge what the stakes are of only regarding it as particular to these issues related 
to gay marriage rights; in reality, the case affects other realms of identity politics as well 
as issues of class and race.  While reading this thesis, please keep in mind that the core 
focus on marriage is a result of the restricted margins set by the terms of the thesis and is 
not determinative of the level of importance of different kinship care formations; if you 
read this scholarship as just about marriage, then you are not engaging in the 
intersectional approach of coalition building nor are you understanding the full 
comprehension of assemblages that queer organizing requires us to do if we want 
transformative change.  DOMA not only affects the right to marriage, it also controls 
“over 1,000 federal statutes and numerous federal rgulations…laws pertaining to Social 
Security, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright, and veterans’ benefits” (Goad).  
These mentioned federal regulations are bundled as one package and are distributed 
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based on the legality of marriage – both of which are unacceptable forms of an ethical 
politics of kinship care, according to me. 
Steve Ralls, a member of the advocacy group Immigration Equality, believes U.S. 
v. Windsor is “a development that could affect 35,000 same-sex couples where one of the 
partners is an immigrant” (Nather); Ralls is referring to legal tax benefits, recipients of 
asylum, and citizenship as well as permanent residency statuses.  However, his statement 
does not take into account intersectional issues that can’t be encompassed by the legal 
ramifications of “gay marriage” legislation.  For instance, class status determines the 
level of tax benefits – or lack thereof – that any federally recognized marriage can 
produce/attain/obtain. 
I could focus on many intersecting issues resulting from U.S. v. Windsor, because 
its outcomes encapsulate the idea of intersectionality; however, I will give a brief 
synopsis of how the case has affected immigration rights in order to demonstrate an 
example of this case’s impact on what are seemingly unrelated aspects of marriage rights 
and/or gay rights.   
As many scholars have pointed out (A. Smith; Puar; Spade; Reddy), the granting 
of green cards through certain gay marriage rights post- U.S. v. Windsor further supports 
U.S. ascendency by deeming the U.S. as a “safe” place for LGBTIQ folks.  U.S. v. 
Windsor exemplifies how one legal case differentiated by the specific issue of marriage 
and its targeted community can affect the present and impact the future of other areas of 
kinship care and rights-based legislation such as immigration rights.  Looking at the 
aftermath from the U.S. v. Windsor case: 
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The Obama administration has adopted the view that federal immigration benefits 
with regard to immigration visa petitions under Section 201(b) extend to same-sex 
foreign spouses of American citizens, and has moved quickly, since the repeal of 
DOMA section 3, to put this view into action (Jeang). 
 
 
Sponsoring a spouse to get a green card is now a benefit of legal gay marriage from the 
U.S. v. Windsor case decision, as long as one of the spouses is legally labeled as a U.S. 
citizen.  It does not matter what state you live in or its state marriage policies, as long as 
you were legally married in one of the states that currently recognizes same-sex marriage, 
then you can apply for a green card.  To be more clear, “even if they don’t live in a state 
that has legalized same-sex marriage, these couples should be able to take advantage of 
the ruling as long as they get married in a state wh re it is legal” (Nather).  The first 
example of U.S. v. Windsor’s aftermath on immigration rights was documented in Florida 
when a green card was issued to Traian Popov, “a Bulgarian immigrant who lives with 
his American spouse, Julian Marsh” (Preston). 
Mainstream media’s portrayal of Edith Windsor as a “good citizen” is supported 
by how Spyer is often displayed in the media.  The vast majority of media sources 
intentionally mention Spyer’s familial origins in Holland and/or her knowledge of the 
Dutch (language); from this, we could posit that the media’s intentions are to further 
validate Windsor as a “good” U.S. citizen as opposed to either the lack of mention of 
Spyer’s citizenship to the U.S. or the explicit mentio  of her “foreignness” as Dutch.  In 
other words, Windsor’s spouse is mentioned as “foreign” to some degree as opposed to 
Windsor’s “Americanness;” however, due to Spyer’s “background” in Holland, she is 
simultaneously painted as a “good foreigner” rather an what Jasbir Puar has termed as a 
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“terrorist body.”  The earlier legal cases about immigration and Windsor’s own case 
raises the question of what kind of immigrants and/or “foreigners” are considered “good 
enough” or legitimate enough to be added to the U.S. populace and, consequently, who 
are not – as important/vital as this question is, the necessary critical analysis expands past 
the scope of this thesis.  In addition to the mainstream media’s implicit references to 
Windsor’s ethnicity and citizenship status, the normalizing of ableism is also applied to 
what constitutes a “good citizen” as demonstrated by Windsor’s portrayal in the media as 
elderly but still mobile. 
In keeping with Reddy’s amendment approach, the historical discussion of 
immigration status and same-sex marriage is important.  In 1982, Adams v. Howerton 
determined “that the homosexual marriage of an American citizen and a non-citizen did 
not qualify the non-citizen as a spouse” (Jeang).  The legislation was based on the 
description of a “homosexual” as “afflicted with a psychopathic personality, sexual 
deviation, or mental defect” (Jeang); in 1990, Congress “repealed the statutory exclusion 
of homosexuals as psychopaths” (Jeang).  Although U.S. v. Windsor creates some 
benefits to some gay couples, it actively devalues couples who choose/decide not to get 
married but still want their partners to be able to apply for green cards.  Why is it okay 
for a partner in a married couple to become a permanent resident, but it is not okay for a 
partner in a non-married couple to become a permanent resident?  This concept 
supporting immigration status as it relates to legalized gay marriage champions marriage 
as the only acceptable and normalized approach to any given relationship.  Another 
example of how immigration law privileges only a limited number of kinship structures is 
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through the parent-child relationship; however, the meaning of “parent” only refers to 
those who are biologically and legally defined as such. 
In relation to immigration rights, the gay marriage rights movement “leaves out 
the predicaments, for instance, of single people and those who do not define themselves 
within conventional, conjugal, marital relationships” (DasGupta).  An ethical politics of 
kinship care addresses issues related to immigration w th a multi-faceted understanding: 
 
Queering immigration calls for an examination of the power relationships which 
undergird the lives and aspirations of LGBT-identified immigrants, and in doing 
so humbly seeks to join larger struggles against global capital and violence 
against racialized, sexualized, and feminized bodies across geopolitical borders 
(DasGupta). 
 
This examination of power relationships is directly onnected to the leftist political 
frameworks I call for in my thesis and previously discussed in Chapter I.  The statement 
also looks at how struggles can be viewed as individually experienced as well as within a 
larger context of collective political struggles. 
Another interesting thing to consider while thinking about assimilation strategies 
related to the gay (marriage) rights movement is the aftermath of U.S. v. Windsor 
regarding immigration law.  It provides an example of assimilation tactics within the U.S. 
through the nationalist project of legalized marriage: spouses in same-sex marriages can 
now apply for a green card/permanent residency due to the appeal of DOMA’s Section 3.  
Furthermore, it “yields a sense of urgency that makes non-conjugal intimacies and 
alternatives to neoliberal ethics of care ‘abstract’ or ‘unrealistic’” (Whitehead 308).  
Evidenced by historical analyses, current legal institutions of kinship and family policies 
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are also racialized.  Due to the state’s regulation of immigration policies and its 
dependence upon patriarchal and heteronormative familial norms, queer immigrants of 
color are faced with an even harsher contradiction: “notions of freedom and security are 
negated or denied…by the same legal and civil infrastructure that, through immigration 
apparatus, denies queer immigrants permanent access to the civil and legal infrastructures 
of the US nation-state” (“Rights Based Freedom” 164).  Looking at “family” as a 
regulative formation is directly connected to how family discourse gets taken up and 
disseminated by society. 
Family as a regulatory figuration often gets recognized as being a component of 
what makes a “loving/compassionate” individual.  Legalizing only certain kinship 
structures such as marriage further deems only those structures as the legitimate choice 
for a “caring” person and therefore, excludes individuals who do not fit into this political 
category.  Windsor’s case extends the option for indiv duals participating in legalized gay 
marriage to be viewed as caring which is also related to being a “good citizen” – further 
stigmatizing anyone fitting into “the other” category as not-good citizens or bad citizens 
(or less-than citizens.)  Societal beliefs concerning marriage has impacted how couples 
are perceived; for instance, “marriage is seen as the ‘ultimate’ legal status validating 
equality of same-sex relationships” (Fingerhut 233).    
Although the Human Rights Campaign Foundation (HRC) will be a focus in 
Chapter III, the following statement made by its currently appointed president, Chad 
Griffin, displays how the national nonprofit organization connects the connotation of a 
loving couple with the right to marry: “HRC will bring the best minds from across the 
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nation together and provide every resource we can to e d discrimination against loving 
gay couples once and for all” (Haberman).  In order to expand the scope of who is 
considered to be a loving individual and in what capacity, there needs to be a disruption 
of “normative conceptions of domesticity, love and care by not locking these concepts to 
static gendered bodies with immutable affective skills” (Manalansan).  Similar to my 
personal experiences with kinship care, I find thatlove – both in terms of being loved and 
loving another – vary greatly in definition, scope, experience, relationship status, etc.  I 
urge you to consider how you might frame an ethical politics of kinship care that either 
includes a pluralistic understanding of love and/or isentangles kinship care formations 
with the concept of love altogether; I would choose th  latter option but I feel that either 
option could be valid in its own way. 
The U.S. v. Windsor case perpetuates limitations regarding kinship ideologies and 
structures.  By relying on legal cases as the status indicator for the socio-political climate 
of the gay marriage debate, it further convolutes the interactions between social 
acceptance/understanding of marriage within legal recognition and the associated 
political approval of what constitutes as a legible kinship care formation.  This 
association discounts, disregards, and invalidates the lived experiences of people who 
resist the legally sanctioned kinship regulations.  Confined to inadequate and restricted 
boundaries/limitations of the current legal system and political régime, an ethical politics 
of kinship care cannot reach its full transformational potential to include all humans’ 
formations and choices of kinship care.  The revoluti nary potential is based on the 
 
60 
consideration of how legal reform can affect kinship care both in the contemporary 
period as well as the future.
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CHAPTER III 
 
MARRIAGE RIGHTS = GAY RIGHTS? 
 
 
Proponents of same-sex marriage are much less radical than they appear in 
contemporary, mainstream American consciousness.  Rather than asking for a 
redefinition of marriage and its social function, they are simply asking to be 
governed according to a neoliberal logic, as opposed to coexisting authoritarian 
and hierarchical models (Whitehead 295). 
 
 
How do identity politics influence kinship?  How are identity politics taken up in 
the gay marriage rights movement?  What is the political agenda for kinship policies’ 
gendered and racialized natures?  In socio-political movements, how can we de-
essentialize identities, and what are the effects?  Since identity politics tend to be 
considered parallel with assimilating into dominant institutions, is there a way to promote 
the benefits of identity politics while still engagin  in a leftist, anti-assimilationist 
framework? 
In Chapter II, I described the social climate regarding the legal status of marriage 
equality; particularly focusing on how the U.S. v. Windsor case and its primary subject, 
Edith Windsor, have been taken up by mainstream media sources.  Continuing along the 
same focus of mainstream agendas, this chapter discusses the current climate surrounding 
the gay (marriage) rights activist movement and more specifically the mainstream 
national organizations that advocate for marriage equality.  I intentionally use the phrase 
gay (marriage) rights as a defining label for this movement, since the organizations and 
their strategic approaches have been primarily consumed by the promotion of gay 
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marriage rights rather than a more intersectional udertaking of gay rights; in other 
words, although many mainstream LGBT organizations have mission statements that 
regard gay rights from a more inclusive perspective, many of the concerns and inequities 
experienced by vulnerable people within LGBTQAI communities are not being addressed 
but rather are being swept under the metaphorical rug. The premise of the gay (marriage) 
rights movement is based on the viewpoint of “how being denied marriage prevents them 
[gay couples] from fully protecting themselves and their families in the case of life’s 
inevitable dangers” (Whitehead 294).  In other words, denying marriage rights to gay 
couples is considered to be a violation of human, bsic rights; it further assumes that 
through the assimilation into marriage, gay families would then be able to protect 
“themselves” from “inevitable dangers” that life creates.  It is ridiculous to think that 
marriage is the end-all-be-all solution to protecting families from danger.  This viewpoint 
of marriage also acts as a façade to the exclusionary pr ctices of the mainstream 
movement by asserting that marriage is the answer for all life problems. 
Also discussed in Chapter II, I understand that legal marriage can protect certain 
rights for certain groups of people; however, it is not the answer for imagining an ethical 
politics of kinship care.  Contrary to commonly held beliefs among the mainstream 
agenda, marriage rights are not synonymous with gay rights; instead, marriage rights 
could be one out of many potential sites within a much larger undertaking of gay rights.  
However by solely focusing on the gay (marriage) rights movement rather than an 
intersectional approach to the needs of LGBTQAI folks who are more vulnerable to other 
forms of inequities, not only is this movement failing to address all potential sites for 
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transformational change but also is actively producing disposable persons.  In the final 
section of this chapter, I engage with my claim of h w current gay (marriage) rights 
movement and its associated legal strategies actively cr ate and produce disposable 
people in greater depth. 
In this chapter, I discuss the role(s) of identity politics within the mainstream gay 
(marriage) rights movement, primarily focusing on the Humans Right Campaign 
Foundation (HRC) which I use as a leading example of a mainstream gay (marriage) 
rights organization.  Instead of critiquing HRC under a single framework analysis, I 
engage in a more critical analysis concerned with how identity politics have been taken 
up by – as well as promoted by – HRC.  In particular, I m concerned with analyzing 
HRC’s campaigns, media presence, and articulation of politics.   
The purpose behind creating an ethical politics of kinship care is the potential for 
transformation.  By assimilating and replicating dominant institutions, rights-based 
movements do not have the capacity to be transformational.  In accordance with Cohen’s 
definition of transformational politics: 
 
A politics that does not search for opportunities to integrate into dominant 
institutions and normative social relationships, but instead pursues a political 
agenda that seeks to change values, definitions, and laws which make these 
institutions and relationships oppressive (“Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare 
Queens” 445). 
 
I appreciate how Cohen frames her understanding of transformational politics as it 
opposes assimilation’s negative effects. 
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Abandoning and/or critiquing identity politics is not the most effective resistance 
approach since the result negates two separate but linked manifestations of power: the 
first being the power of agency to define oneself via categorization; and “the other, the 
power to cause that categorization to have social and material consequence” (Crenshaw, 
“Mapping Margins” 1297).  As mentioned in Chapter II, Reddy states, “the discursive 
and historical formations or bodies that the amendment reanimates and keeps alive 
continually exceed its framing” (“Freedom’s Amendments” 17).  Exceeding past the 
limitations of a person’s political framing is an important concept to consider.  
Intersectionality provides an additional approach to validating that people’s reality 
extends past these boxes created by politics and supported by identity politics’ use of 
categories. 
The Human Rights Campaign Foundation 
The Human Rights Campaign Foundation (HRC) is a leading example of a 
national mainstream nonprofit organization that infuses its activist/advocacy projects 
with identity politics.  According to HRC’s official webpage, the following excerpt is 
HRC’s mission statement: 
 
The Human Rights Campaign is America's largest civil rights organization 
working to achieve lesbian, gay, bisexual and transge der equality. By inspiring 
and engaging all Americans, HRC strives to end discrimination against LGBT 
citizens and realize a nation that achieves fundamental fairness and equality for all 
(HRC). 
 
 
HRC’s mission does not directly state that marriage equality is its key agenda; however, 
in reality, the amount of time and energy that HRC spends on the marriage equality 
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movement signifies the issue as one of HRC’s primary agenda items – as evidenced by 
the amount of time dedicated to the discussion of marriage rights during HRC’s annual 
2013 National Dinner in Washington, D.C.  As stated on the HRC’s official website, the 
nonprofit organization has six official programs: Global Engagement Program, Youth & 
Campus Engagement Program, Workplace Equality Program, Religion & Faith Program, 
Health & Aging Program, and Children, Youth & Families Program.  It is not my 
intention to negate HRC’s activist endeavors concering LGBT rights other than 
marriage equality; my point here is to emphasize the monumental impact HRC has had 
on the political and social realms of the gay (marriage) rights movement. 
I understand the motivations and intentions behind the HRC’s (along with other 
similarly directed organizations’) timely reactions/responses in supporting and 
advocating for the issue of marriage equality since the political and social climate around 
marriage equality is a pressing topic in both the media and legal arenas.  According to 
Baunach, “The trend in attitudes toward gay marriage mirrors in direction, if not in 
magnitude, changing public opinion on homosexuality” (347).  As far as I can determine, 
the discussion of gay marriage equality within the legal and socio-political arenas 
correlate with the same time period during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s when being 
“homosexual” was no longer considered a psychological defect.   
In order to emphasize HRC’s primary focus on marriage rights, I will attempt to 
describe the visual formatting and discursive layout of its official webpage.  When 
visiting HRC’s official webpage, the organization’s logo of a yellow equals sign within a 
blue box appears as a banner at the top of the page followed by a row of general 
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categories or web-labels that link each topic to its associated HRC-published webpage, 
these classifications include topics such as “Issue” or “Resources.”  More precisely, by 
pressing any of these nine available labels, the audience/viewer is virtually connected to a 
more detailed list of content/options to choose from pertaining to the scope of your 
chosen label.  As evidenced by these labels, it is v s ble that HRC’s advocacy and 
activism reaches far beyond the scope of marriage rights equality.  However, next to the 
seven generalized topics digitally represented in black/white labels in this row, there are 
two larger, more pronounced web-links.  “Donate” is depicted in a red box-themed web-
link.  The next specialized web-link is illustrated in a bright-yellow highlighted button 
entitled “Marriage.”  As demonstrated by how HRC chooses to showcase this issue on its 
initial/home webpage as opposed to the other many issues HRC website eventually 
names on a secondary webpage, HRC further situates itself as one of the main national 
nonprofit organizations that lead the gay (marriage) rights movement. 
 HRC enlists assimilation tactics that are focused on single-issue politics.  
According to Dr. Ian Barnard, associate professor in the English department and a queer 
studies faculty member at CSUN, “For [HRC] gay is the only criterion” (Johnson).  This 
could be taken in two ways.  The first is that since there is a common denominator or set 
criterion – being gay – then HRC could be considere intersectional due to the broad 
intersectional identities that have the potential to fit into that category.  The second way 
to look at it is that HRC has taken an essentialist stance and does not consider the 
intersectional differences among and within identity politics; and therefore, differences in 
issues that also need to be addressed. 
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In order to critically analyze HRC’s articulation of politics, I focus on HRC’s 
“Americans for Marriage Equality” campaign.  HRC launched a campaign in 2013 
entitled “Americans for Marriage Equality.”  The title of the campaign next to a much 
larger font-sized graphic image spelling “USA” is the campaign’s associated logo.  The 
logo creates a “normalized” association between supporting gay marriage rights equality 
and being a “good USA American citizen.”  Likewise, according to the website, the 
campaign is defined as “a public engagement campaign featuring prominent Americans 
who support committed gay and lesbian couples getting married” (HRC).  Notice how the 
word “prominent” is strategically placed as an adjective to describe “Americans” as 
opposed to having “Americans” stand alone.   
Last year, HRC described Edith Windsor, or Edie as HRC affectionately refers to 
her, as “a fair minded-American” (HRC) which further builds on the idea I introduced in 
Chapter II of how mainstream media represents Windsor a  apolitical and/or a “good 
gay/citizen” by being principled, conservative, and controlled in her actions and 
mannerisms.  An additional example of the stereotype of being a “good gay” is when 
HRC purposefully “had little political reaction to he invasion of Afghanistan” (Puar, 
“Mapping” 70).  HRC did not want to upset the nationalist project of the military and/or 
its invasions.  Puar has coined the word “homonatiol sm” or homonormative 
nationalism, meaning the “collusion between homosexuality and American nationalism 
that is generated both by national rhetorics of patriotic inclusion and by gay, lesbian, and 
queer subjects themselves” (“Mapping” 67).  I claim that marriage, particularly its 
legalization, is a nationalist project.  As of February 2014, HRC’s Americans for 
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Marriage Equality campaign is adding a bipartisan dimension to its configuration that 
promotes “a coordinated war room” effort to help disseminate information about the 
efforts in dozens of states to legalize same-sex nuptials” (Haberman).  Due to this 
chapter’s timing of being written during February of 2014, there is not a lot more 
published information about this addition; however, while others read this scholarly 
work, I urge you to consider this component as an avenue for future research and critical 
analysis.  
To further convolute HRC’s campaign with U.S. politics, Hillary Clinton is one of 
the main public figures supporting the Americans for Marriage Equality campaign.  
Choosing a political figure to be the public face of this campaign is a very strategic, and 
telling, approach initiated from HRC.  According to HRC’s webpage, its campaign 
promotes support from “professional athletes, film and music celebrities, political and 
civil rights leaders—and will have a special emphasis on Republicans, African-
Americans, Latinos and elected officials” (HRC).  In this quote, the bundled list 
“Republicans, African-Americans, Latinos and elected officials” is an intentionally 
drafted list and is an example of identity politics’ “Rainbow Theory;” i.e. when the 
slogan, “race, class, and gender,” falters as part of an alliance politics and consequently 
weakens into a fantasized space (Warner 12).  The “Rainbow Theory” is also an example 
of how identity politics can sometimes be taken up in an essentialist manner without 
much consideration of intersectionality and/or differences within identity categories.  
First of all, it lacks mention of intersectionality among identities by not acknowledging 
that African Americans and Latinos can also be partof the LGBTQAI communities 
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and/or queer-friendly.  It further suggests that African-Americans and Latinos are in the 
same category as Republicans.   
To describe the campaign and the campaign’s goals/str tegies in more detail, 
HRC’s official campaign webpage posted: 
 
As part of the Americans for Marriage Equality campaign, HRC executed a 
multi-pronged strategy to win a successful committee vote on the Respect for 
Marriage Act, including lobbying members and working with our allies to prepare 
for attacks against the bill.  If passed, the Respect for Marriage Act would restore 
the rights of all lawfully married couples—including same-sex couples to receive 
the benefits of marriage under federal law (HRC). 
 
 
The campaign highlights HRC’s political and social work supporting the marriage rights 
movement in New York.  The official campaign’s webpage has a special tab dedicated to 
summarizing its impact on New York.  From this, we can get a better idea of the amount 
of time and the different approaches implemented within the larger campaign.  
Employing a total of 30 full time field organizers across New York, HRC “generated 
more than 11,000 phone-calls from constituents to their senators;” “ran twice-weekly 
phone banks, like the one attended by Chelsea Clinton;” “generated more than 44,000 
emails from New Yorkers to their state lawmakers;” and “delivered more than 53,000 
post cards from constituents to state senators.”  In monetary terms, “HRC contributed 
more than $145,000 through HRC New York PAC to support ro-equality state Senate 
candidates” (HRC). 
The connection between capitalism and family structures is a commonly 
recognized relationship within concepts of classism: “The expansion of capital and the 
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spread of wage labor have affected a profound transformation in the structure and 
functions of the nuclear family, the ideology of family life, and the meaning of 
heterosexual relations” (D’Emilio 240).  Spade believes the gay (marriage) rights 
movement to be aligned “with the damaging and disturbing logics of neoliberalism” that 
include perpetuating “myths of family values and meritocracy to suggest that people 
should work hard, and through forming nuclear families, meet the needs unaddressed or 
even exacerbated by capitalism” (“Intersectional Resistance” 1041).  Spade further 
argues:  
 
Not only will same-sex marriage provide little to people without property to 
inherit, legal immigration status to share, or employee health benefits to extend – 
and not only will it fail to protect those queer and trans people who are part of 
populations targeted by the racist, ableist, colonial, and anti-immigrant child 
welfare system from losing their kids – but the quest for same-sex marriage also 
supports norms of family formation that feminist, decolonial, and antiracist 
movement have fought to dismantle for centuries (“Intersectional Resistance” 
1041). 
 
Marriage’s origin is, to a large extent, a “patriarchal, property-passing system” (Boggis) 
that reiterates patriarchal gender norms.  We cannot separate this truth from its 
contemporary presence. 
During the summer of 2013, HRC initiated a Supreme Court campaign that 
restyled the nonprofit organization’s official/traditional blue and yellow equal sign logo 
into a pink equal sign overtop a vibrant red background.  HRC asked supporters of 
marriage equality to change their Facebook profile pictures to the logo; the social media 
tactic went viral fast.  The red logo fad was a clever organizational strategy.  Social 
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media tactics tend to be considered practices of grassroots organizing which is why 
HRC’s decision to implement a grassroots approach is surprising (at least to me) 
considering HRC’s wealthy status and large organization l size.   
Yasmin Nair, an academic writer, commented on the logo campaign’s ability to further 
position “equality” as “something unquestionable and self-explanatory…After all, who 
could be against equality?” (Nair).  Nair’s follow-up statement to why she opposes 
equality is essential to consider and yet is a position frequently left out of the mainstream 
discourse: “But what does the equal sign represent?  Who, exactly, is equal to whom?  In 
a country where even healthcare is inaccessible to most, marriage is an effort that only 
benefits people who already have benefits to share in the first place” (Nair).  As I 
mentioned in Chapter I, implying the concept of “human rights” with the equal sign is a 
façade that is meant to explicitly apply to “everyone” but in reality only serves a selected 
group of people.  I think involving an intersectional approach to legal protections along 
with the transformation of coalition-based will reform socio-political acceptance for an 
ethical politics of kinship care. 
Consistent with the “human rights” language used in HRC’s mission statement, 
“proponents of gay marriage see it as a civil-rights issue” (Boaz); thus further positioning 
the gay (marriage) rights movement within the context of civil rights.  In campaigns, 
thoughtful delegation of the specific phrasing and words are operatively implemented so 
that the campaign’s agenda can gain bystander support and retain its current followers; as 
in the case of marriage equality, “proponents of same-sex marriage use the words ‘rights, 
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protections, and responsibilities’” to highlight the legal and public aspects of the marriage 
contract” (Whitehead 293-4). 
In addition to the rocky foundation associated with assimilation strategies, the 
implementation of the desired laws/regulation do not guarantee, or sometimes even 
support, the necessary changes in social and/or economic conditions.  For instance, the 
criminalization of hate crimes has not fixed the associated problem and in some cases, 
“the existence of hate crime statutes may might actually increase bigotry” (Gerstenfeld 
280).  It is difficult to label certain crimes as hate crimes due to the legislation’s 
vagueness (Gerstenfeld 274), and not all those who enforce authority are educated 
properly about how to process hate crimes and/or effectively support the individuals who 
were victimized (Zaykowski 390).   
A fundamental component behind the activism/services of HRC and similar 
organizations is the use of “rights” discourse.  Many “rights” discourse projects 
implement identity politics in hopes to put a generalized “face” or identity to the political 
issue at hand.  Language and its meanings can provoke powerful emotional responses 
from an intended audience; also anticipated are normalized responses which are 
responses or reactions to a mainstream idea/issue/topic that are (seemingly) expected 
from “good citizens/people.”  For instance, Nair’s semi-sarcastic question about “who 
could be against equality” tends to fall in line with the normalized response to questions 
of equality, partly due to wanting to be supportive and not feeling able to criticize well-
known and respected organizations and/or particular viewpoints.  This relates back to the 
essentialist use of identity politics within social movements to create a false common 
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ground of marriage within LGBTQAI communities.  In other words, if you don’t see 
marriage as the common ground than you are a “bad queer” and, therefore, not supportive 
of your own community. 
Starting in June 2012, Chad Griffin has been the acting president of HRC.  I 
understand that the entirety of HRC does not rest on the sole decisions made by Chad 
Griffin; however, he has had and still has a strong presence in the movement by way of 
evaluating/monitoring the issues HRC could possibly help with in addition to acting as a 
liaison for HRC and many mainstream media sources.  He started his position at HRC in 
the midst of the four and a half year-long legal battle of U.S. v. Windsor, which is another 
reason why I have chosen to focus on him in my research.  His mid-process entry into the 
organization could be a potential indicator of the reasons why he chose to continue with 
HRC’s centralized focus of marriage equality.  Due to Griffin’s recent induction into 
HRC, there has been a lot of focus on his role at HRC in mainstream media.  I am going 
to highlight both how he is taken up within the media in respect to his role at HRC and its 
campaigns surrounding marriage equality. 
I was shocked at some of his interview responses, especially during his interview 
in June 2013 with MetroWeekly.  By shocked, I mean every possibility and meaning of 
the word.  At first, I felt relief that his viewpoints were closer to mine than I had initially 
realized; it appeared that HRC – by way of Griffin’s viewpoints – might be shifting its 
activist approaches to be more inclusive and comprehensive.  On the other hand, I also 
felt confused about the type of nonprofit leader Griffin was, particularly considering his 
leadership position at an assimilationist, rights-ba ed organization that tends to focus its 
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goals on wealth and prestige rather than incorporating queer outlooks/perspectives 
concerning LGBTQIA issues.  However, I did identify some notably key incongruities 
between my hope for a future ethical politics of kinship care with his understanding of 
the issues related to marriage. 
HRC’s longevity and sustainability as a nonprofit organization depends on its 
capacity to work towards fulfilling its mission while simultaneously maintaining an 
annual financial break-even or surplus budget; this is often referred to as the double 
bottom line of nonprofit organizations.  If HRC’s mission was successfully 
met/completed, then there would be no need for HRC’s existence; hence, the continuation 
of the problems that its mission statement addresses till needs to occur in order for HRC 
to stay “in business.”  In other words, if HRC “accomplished” its mission and created 
equality for LGBT communities across all realms, then the reasons for HRC would cease 
to exist.  Even though the HRC is a nonprofit organiz tion, it still is run as an 
organization with the long-term goal of continuous s ccess via financial means and 
mission strategy.  According to this theory, there is some sort of convoluted motivation to 
keep the problem/issue addressed in the mission slightly operative in order for HRC to 
stay afloat and in existence.  Nonprofit industrialized projects have a specific end goal in 
place different from its mission in order to show the public and management that the 
organization has met its goal.  In the case of the Am ricans for Marriage Equality 
campaign, HRC continually emphasizes how their support in the movement has helped to 
legalize marriage; for example, HRC’s campaign webpage states, “In the first three 
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weeks of May 2013, HRC's extensive on-the-ground support helped usher in marriage 
equality in Rhode Island, Delaware and Minnesota” (HRC).   
In Chapter IV, I will come back to this idea and explain how the campaign for 
marriage equality actually has adverse effects.  In response to the interviewer’s question 
regarding the criticism from some individuals to the gay rights movement about the focus 
on marriage, Griffin answers, “I think they’re absolutely right.  The media has focused 
like a laser on the issue of marriage.  And this organization [HRC] has in no way shifted 
focus away” (Griffin).  His insight into some of the current criticisms about marriage 
pleasantly surprised me in conjunction with his recognition of how the movement’s 
“spotlight hasn’t been as bright on all the other work that’s really important” because of 
the media’s intense focus on the marriage debate (Griffin).  All in all, it seems that 
Griffin is thankful for the positive media attention, even if its focus is skewed to one 
issue; he even credits the increase of positively portrayed lesbian and gay relationships on 
TV to the marriage equality movement. 
In his interview with MetroWeekly, Chad Griffin stated that HRC’s next focal 
endeavor (after gay marriage is legal) is the support of LGBT communities in southern 
states to obtain equal protections particularly in regards to employment benefits and basic 
rights.  According to Griffin, southern states have “many things beyond marriage – or 
before marriage –” to work out (Griffin).  Even though I agree that there are things 
beyond/before marriage that need to be addressed, I would also like to emphasize 
Griffin’s specification of southern states.  Although there are a number of other states 
spanning across the country that also do not legally h ve equal protections set up for 
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LGBTIQ community members, it is a common belief held among many that southern 
states are less “progressive” than others; and maybe Griffin, being from a southern state, 
believes the same thing due to his experiences.  This belief presumes that folks in New 
York City and other northern metropolitan areas don’t face these same issues of 
classism/racism/etc.; however, these issues exist in all cities no matter their geographic 
region although they do differ in intensity and appearance.  I also believe that marriage is 
not the primary/basic/pressing issue affecting the majority of the LGBTQIA communities 
especially along the divisions of class, race, and gender expression (and so on, 
metaphorically and practically).   
Griffin’s use of the term “marriage” rather than “family” or “kinship care” implies 
where his priorities rest with the promotion/continuation of the institution of marriage; 
his level of understanding does not seem to extend b yond a monogamous, romantic 
relationship between two adults which is also the limited population that marriage rights 
target.  According to HRC’s webpage regarding its Americans for Marriage Equality 
campaign, “Only marriage can provide families with true equality, and we need your help 
to make it a reality” (HRC); this type of stance is very harmful to how we imagine the 
future of an ethical politics of kinship care.  It further promotes marriage as the only 
kinship formation that is qualified as a valid relationship and further stigmatizes other 
forms of kinship care that do not fit into such a narrow box.  Griffin also advocates for 
legal change as the sole effort used in gay rights movements to forefront LGBT equality; 
instead, I hope to one day reconfigure the relationship between kinship ideologies and 
government regulations/control.  I think individuals should have the ability – 
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economically, socially, and legally – to define what kinship means to each 
person/relationship as well as have the right to choose how to incorporate kinship 
structures within their own lived realities.  In the same breath, I also believe that legal 
support should exist in order to nurture individuals, particularly individuals facing more 
vulnerable realities. 
Two of Griffin’s later comments in the interview about believing “that the rising 
boat for marriage lifts everything else up, because it has enabled us to tell our stories” 
and “as a whole it [marriage] benefits the community across the board” (Griffin) are 
consistent with the idea that marriage is, and can be, a common ground for everyone in 
the LGBTQIA communities, which is not the case in my opinion.  Griffin’s statements 
also misplace HRC’s use of identity politics as essentialist and exclusionary.  He 
excludes members of LGBTQAI communities who do not wish to participate in the 
institution of marriage nor see it as a common ground/goal.  His exclusions further 
essentialize LGBTQAI communities as being preoccupied with the single issue of 
marriage equality and thus promoting marriage as “the norm;” which further reiterates 
that people fitting outside the norms are “bad” and/or isposable.   
Disposable People 
The gay (marriage) rights movement has predominantly focused on adults, with 
the exception of how the marriage between two adults can affect family law in regards to 
the custody of children.  The rights of children within structures of kinship care are also 
normalized in similar ways as prevalent in the exclusionary practices of marriage rights.  
Although this thesis focuses primarily on the gay (marriage) rights movement’s role 
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within a broader understanding of kinship ideologies, the principal objective for this 
thesis is to start discussions on how to imagine/create an ethical politics of kinship care 
through coalition building by recognizing a need for cross-community solidarity in order 
to invoke real transformation/change.  Spade believs, “transformative change can only 
arise through mass mobilization led by populations most directly impacted by the harmful 
systems that distribute vulnerability and security” (Normal Life 28).  This transformative 
change into an ethical politics of kinship care needs to be fronted by the people who have 
been previously – and currently – deemed as disposable.  I have implicitly discussed how 
disposable people come to be through norms, legislation, and exclusion; now, I wish to 
reiterate the grave importance of how these issues aff ct real people.  On a personal as 
well as relational level, this thesis has been monumental in dismantling how I have been 
regarded in the past as a disposable person. 
As evident thus far, the fight for marriage equality does nothing to redefine 
kinship’s legal system.  According to Polikoff, “As a civil rights movement, it seeks 
access to marriage as it now exists” (Introduction 7).  It doesn’t expand kinship’s 
definition nor grant rights to protect LGBTQAI folks who choose not to assimilate into 
the institution of marriage.  Instead, the gay (marriage) rights movement keeps these 
oppressive institutions in place.  It further creates hierarchies of value among individuals 
based on whether or not their kinship structures fit into the limited definitions concerning 
legal marriage and/or family law.  Implicitly suggest d by HRC and other mainstream 
sources, those who do not conform – either by not getting married and/or opposing 
marriage altogether – are placed at the lowest status among the institutional/systematic 
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hierarchy of LGBTQ communities; in other words, these non-conforming/non-normative 
people are considered disposable.  Here is what I mean by disposable: In today’s climate, 
individuals vulnerable to injustices/inequities due to a lack of or the non-existence of 
legal policies protecting their well-being are treaed as disposable, as if legal protections 
considered to be human rights should not be extended to cover them due to a lack of 
personal importance. 
To start this discussion on disposable people and how t ey are created, I want to 
return to how the HRC has specifically produced disposable people through its practices; 
HRC has a history of trans* exclusion and immigrant exclusion.  HRC’s trans* exclusion 
came into the public/mainstream limelight during 2007, when HRC supported a version 
of the Employee Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) “that excluded protections for 
employees facing discrimination based on gender identity” (Johnson).  HRC’s reasoning 
centered on the fact that ENDA was more likely to pass if trans* people were not 
included or protected and that HRC would later include trans* people down the line; in 
other words, “trans people could wait their turn” (Johnson); I don’t even need to tell you 
how seriously fucked up I consider this “strategy” to be.  On April 1, 2013, HRC’s  Vice 
President of Communications and Marketing issued an official apology on behalf of the 
organization regarding the following incident: 
 
In one case, a trans activist was asked to remove the trans pride flag from behind 
the podium, and in another, a queer undocumented spaker was asked to remove 
reference to his immigration status in his remarks (Sainz). 
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This incident occurred on March 27, 2013 during the “United for Marriage” rallies led by 
HRC concerning the Supreme Court rulings on gay marriage.  When Jerssay Arredondo, 
a member of the Queer Undocumented Immigrant Project (QUIP), was invited by HRC 
to speak at the United We Dream rally, he was told t  “revise his speech just prior to 
getting on stage to NOT include that he was undocumented” (Kristofferson).  According 
to Dr. Barnard, “You end up reproducing the same kind of demonization of trans people 
that the hegemonic political establishment is producing” (Johnson); that is to say, HRC 
played a key role in producing trans* communities and undocumented immigrant 
communities as disposable.   
“At-risk youth” is another example of a disposable population.  In some 
situations, this statement could be academically accepted as valid without any additional 
evidence or explanation needed.  However, that is not acceptable – these issues in my 
thesis have serious implications and should not be ignored; we should not accept that at-
risk youth deserve to be taken up in disposable ways.  I would like to revisit a personal 
experience that I mentioned in Chapter I about living within a kinship structure deviant 
from the norm.  When I was sixteen years old, I waslabeled an at-risk youth; at that 
moment in time, my rights as a human disintegrated – I became disposable.  I no longer 
had a face/name/story; but rather, the identity category of “at-risk youth” engulfed the 
security of my well-being (or lack thereof).  While living in the alternative home from 
2004-2006, the state of Montana had no legal authority t  regulate the type/level of care I 
was subjected to nor any other child/teen living in any of these unlicensed Montana 
alternative homes: “To clarify, the focus has been on facilities that are not licensed and 
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not operated by public or governmental systems but operate private, residential facilities 
for troubled or difficult children or youth under the age of eighteen” (Behar 402).  There 
was no legislation in place to protect my well-being from certain levels of abuse within 
the walls of the all-girls home; at that time, my “home” wasn’t even licensed in any 
capacity. 
In 2005, state law required the creation of a new board, the Board of Private 
Alternative Adolescent Residential or Outdoor Programs (PAARP), in hopes to start a 
discussion on how to regulate all of these un-licensed and un-documented homes for at-
risk youth in Montana (CAFETY).  This board was made up of five individuals; three of 
which owned/worked for alternative programs/homes – and one of those three “involved” 
board members was my guardian mother – which signifies how biased the board’s 
decisions would be.  PAARP successfully shut down a bill that aimed to protect the youth 
living in these alternative homes by creating state and federal regulations via licensure, 
safety and training requirements, etc.; and just as quickly as the bill died, the board 
created their own bill that they used as an artifact to disseminate into mainstream media 
sources of how they were being “cooperative” or agreeable to state concerns.  During the 
2007 Montana Legislature, their bill was passed “requiring alternative schools to be 
licensed and regulated by the Board of Private Alternative Adolescent Residential or 
Outdoor Programs (PAARP) under the Department of Labor” (CAFETY).  In other 
words, instead of federal or state regulations, the program administrators themselves 
could regulate one another!  This is also the firstoccurrence in which the Department of 
Labor has overseen any sort of youth programs or youth residential services “as opposed 
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to [the] knowledgeable and far more suitable Department of Public Health and Human 
Services” (CAFETY).  It is absolutely ridiculous to see how politically-infused and 
skewed the legal system has become and continues to be in treating at-risk youth in 
Montana as well as some other states that have similarly produced disposable youth. 
How can a whole state ignore a population of “at-risk youth” for decades?  
Reports of abuse, neglect, and even fatalities havebeen reported to state officials from 
within these homes.  Legislation is in the midst of rying to find a solution to “this 
problem,” but for the purpose of this section, I want to emphasize the importance of how 
we treat one another as humans really is to the lives and livelihoods of real people.  
Although extreme, this is an example of how the current systems have failed to protect 
individuals who did not fit into the limited legal recognitions of kinship care.  By only 
providing certain rights through the institution of marriage, current systems will continue 
to fail other excluded, disposable populations; and thus, actively producing disposable 
persons.  My interventions start here, at the place wh re the most vulnerable people are 
affected. 
 
83 
CHAPTER IV 
 
AN ETHICAL POLITICS OF KINSHIP CARE 
 
 
While many in the LGBT community call for legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage, many others – heterosexual and/or LGBT – are shaping for themselves 
the relationships, unions, and informal kinship systems that validate and support 
their daily lives, the lives they are actually living, regardless of what direction the 
current ideological winds might be blowing (Acey et al.). 
 
 
What would it look like to abandon the marriage equality movement, and instead, 
ignite a movement calling for a more comprehensive undertaking of kinship care?  What 
political agenda does it leave us with?  What political vision of society do leftist 
strategists hope to produce? 
There might not be a comprehensive way to conceive of a proposed solution since 
any future vision is as yet unknown.  Craig Willse warns that “our wish for a common 
language that makes sense, our wish for an activism with the right message, our wish for 
a truth that will set us free: these are dangerous desires” (“Meaningless Political Action”).  
A lack of available/accessible language to describe non-normative kinship care 
formations continues to be a legal problem centered on not knowing how to “include” 
other types of kinship care in legal protections.  Similar to my experience with 
unavailable language that describes the relationships I have with the girls I lived with in 
the Montana home, many people are faced with the inabil ty to describe the complexities 
of their kinship formations to the rest of the world.  Although I do not propose any exact 
solution to my analysis, I recommend queer analysis a  the starting point for an ethical 
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politics of kinship care that builds coalitions centered on validating all types of kinship 
care.  According to Puar, “Opening up to the fantastic l wonders of futurity is the most 
powerful of political and critical strategies, whetr it be through assemblage or to 
something as yet unknown, perhaps even forever unknowable” (“Queer Times, Queer 
Assemblages” 137).  The concept of assemblages is an alternative mode of research to 
identity politics which is considered to be “more attuned to interwoven forces that merge 
and dissipate time, space, and body against linearity, coherency, and permanency” (Puar, 
“Queer Times” 127).  I think that the ideas supporting both assemblages as well as 
identity politics need to be incorporated into how we imagine the future.  Due to the 
limitations of this scholarly work, I will not concentrate on assemblages in any significant 
detail; however, I do believe assemblages are an equally important strategy to be further 
involved in the ongoing conversation of creating an ethical politics of kinship care. 
By analyzing and critiquing assimilation agendas, we are able to originate some 
of the foundations for creating an ethical politics of kinship care.  In Chapter I, I compare 
the gay marriage rights movement to applying a Band-Aid fix that only brushes the 
surface of the issue.  By focusing on reforming administrative laws, we challenge the 
very political and legal foundations that equality discourse finds itself situated/erected 
upon.  In other words, gay marriage rights/equality movement could be transformed into 
a queer politics coalition focused on administrative law reformation centering on how all
kinship care formations can be protected legally and socially perceived openly.  Through 
the identification of how assimilation strategies can actively produce disposable people, 
we are critically engaging in a multi-faceted framework of coalitions.  I see coalitions as 
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a strategy interested in systematically deconstructing or reforming an institution and as 
continuing to ally across identities, experiences, and vulnerabilities for the well-being of 
all people. 
My investigation into plausible legal approaches for c alition building has been 
primarily steered by Dean Spade’s Normal Life.  According to Spade, trans* politics act 
as a model for leftist frameworks which my thesis also employs.  Spade rejects the 
application of anti-discrimination laws, hate crime laws, and equality legislation – 
especially since they have not been comprehensively successful – and instead focuses on 
administrative laws/governances that work to “naturlize” identities.  Trans* resistance 
aims to build coalitions with “other emerging formations that are struggling to formulate 
resistance to neoliberalism in these complex and difficult times” (Spade, Normal Life 33).   
Spade’s “Fighting to Win” provides insight into the Sylvia Rivera Law Project, 
one of the queer organizations I followed during this esis process.  Spade also 
negotiates what an allied agenda with an intersectional approach would look like.  He 
challenges the exclusionary practices of the privileged and mainstreamed gay and lesbian 
movement, while also narrating the structural inequalities faced by low-income queers, 
transpeople, and queers of color.  According to Spade: 
 
In part because a white, liberal civil rights discourse has framed the LGBfakeT 
rights movement, the vital importance of these issue  to the lives of most 
transpeople has often remained undocumented, underanalyzed, and insufficiently 
acted upon by our emergent movements (“Fighting to Win” 50).   
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Spade again touches on coalition building and some pot ntial steps in broadening the 
concept of social justice which I have applied in my thesis. 
In “Transnational Adoption and Queer Diasporas” David Eng defines queer 
diaspora as an emerging concept/methodology that “contest[s] traditional family and 
kinship structures – of reorganizing national and transnational communities based not on 
origin, filiation, and genetics but on destination, affiliation, and the assumption of a 
common set of social practices or political commitments” (4).  Eng’s concept of queer 
diaspora reorganizes how kinship structures are undrstood and are taken up within 
conversations.  Eng closely critiques U.S. married couples’ transnational adoptions, as 
the situation/issue interacts with racial politics in addition to the relative ease and speed 
in which the adopted child becomes legally recognized as a citizen.  In previous decades, 
gay and lesbian mainstream movements considered legal family structures as less 
important when coming out: “The movement of individuals away from agrarian-based 
familial units and actualized through the severing of family and kinship bonds – a 
severing later mirrored, even embraced, in the politics of gay liberation and ‘coming 
out’” (Eng, “Transnational Adoption” 5).  Eng’s reference of “coming out” practices 
relate to kinship structures by engaging with it on a deep level; in particular, my thesis 
has referenced ideas and applies theories from his bookThe Feeling of Kinship.  Eng also 
lays claim to how kinship is taken up within privatiz tion through moving within/outside 
the public arena: 
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We need to consider the multiple ways in which economic agency, political 
power, and social recognition are becoming increasingly privatized as a function 
of capital, while civil society continues to shrink and priorities are shifted from 
social services to capital maximization (“Transnational Adoption” 12).  
 
 
Eng’s “The Law of Kinship” chapter in The Feeling of Kinship examines queer 
liberalism, specifically its law of kinship, by marking the genealogy of freedom.  Eng 
describes different spaces in which kinship is taken up; for instance, a queer person 
coming out of the closet could risk the status of current particular family/kinship bonds 
while alternatively opening up different possibilities of family/kinship structures.  As 
earlier mentioned in Chapter II, gays and lesbians reach “liberation” by verifying their 
capability as U.S. citizen-subjects of the nation-state; “in this regard, family is not just 
whom you choose but on whom you choose to spend your m ney” (Eng, Feelings of 
Kinship 30).  Eng profiles the evolution of property in marri ge, family, civil society, and 
state political forms.  In conclusion, Eng suggests “refocusing progressive efforts on 
household diversity, rather than organizing solely for same-sex marriage, [which] could 
generate a broad vision of social justice that resonates on many fronts” (Feelings of 
Kinship 57). 
Queer Advocacy Organizations 
The advocacy organizations that I have researched in this chapter all identify as 
queer and/or radical groups.  Although gay marriage rights might not be their focus or 
even their goal, their missions are aligned with fighting for LGBTQIA liberation and 
equitable justice which is similar to the foundational goals outlined by many gay 
marriage rights proponents.  According to Willse, “Queer and transgender movements 
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that seek real liberation and freedom for everyone might turn out to be movements that 
don’t look like what we call “gay rights” movements” (“Ban Marriage”).  Differing from 
many of the national organizations’ priority of marri ge equality however, queer/radical 
groups “have a different structure and different politics” (Dettmer 35).  Duggan observes: 
“In New York City, queer groups predominantly made up of people of color, such as the 
Audre Lorde Project, Queers for Economic Justice, and FIERCE, tend to prioritize 
around poverty, racism, immigration, health care, retirement, and violence on the street” 
(Dettmer 35).  As earlier stated by Spade, these typ s of issues faced by vulnerable 
populations are the necessary rallying/starting points we should implement to engage in 
transformative change. 
Southerners on New Ground (SONG), a southeastern regional nonprofit 
organization, is a queer organization that comprehensiv ly addresses issues of social 
justice in the south.  According to the organization’s official website, SONG’s mission 
statement declares: 
 
SONG is a home for LGBTQ liberation across all lines of race, class, abilities, 
age, culture, gender, and sexuality in the South. We build, sustain, and connect a 
southern regional base of LBGTQ people in order to t ansform the region through 
strategic projects and campaigns developed in response to the current conditions 
in our communities. SONG builds this movement through leadership 
development, intersectional analysis, and organizing (Southerners on New 
Ground). 
 
 
SONG electronically issued a resource tool worksheet, “How Do We Relate: The 
Relationships between Forms of Oppression” that is ccessible to the public.  The 
worksheet refigures identity politics by naming/identifying common feelings/effects of 
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oppression and specifying each according to the list d identity formations.  The listed 
identity categories include: People of Color; Elders and Youth; Poor People/Low-income; 
LGBT people; Undocumented Immigrants; Women; and People with Disabilities (“Core 
Organizing Tools”).  This worksheet provides a concrete tool to represent how systems of 
oppression are connected rather than separated by identity categories. 
According to Carastathis, “Conceptualizing identity coalitionally allows us to 
overcome some of the pitfalls of political alliances organized on the premise of 
homogeneous or essential identities” (942).  SONG speaks to the shortcomings that HRC 
failed to address in its own campaigns, specifically HRC’s direct involvement with 
producing trans* and immigrant folks as disposable populations in the eyes of the 
mainstream agenda.  In response to HRC’s apology regarding the organization’s trans* 
exclusive demeanor mentioned in Chapter III, Caitlin Breedlove, SONG’s Co-Director, 
stated, “the best apology is to stop doing the offensive behavior” (Breedlove).  
Queer/radical groups are concerned with the ethical implications of how organizations, 
including their own organizations, are affecting political change. 
Queers for Economic Justice (QEJ) is a queer/radical non-profit organization 
dedicated to challenging poverty and economic injustice  while promoting gender and 
sexual liberation.  QEJ’s “Queer and Transgender Vision Statement on Immigration 
Reform” argues “against privileging conjugal couples generally, whether straight or gay, 
as the locus of immigration benefits, while arguing for the recognition of the flexible 
kinship and friends networks within which LGBT immigrants live and work” 
(DasGupta).  I particularly appreciate their inclusive reference to “flexible kinship and 
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friends networks” in this vision statement.  Considering the flexibility and fluidity of 
kinship care formations is imperative for our future goals; a facet that is included in 
administrative law reform agendas but not the marriage equality movement that specifies 
the longevity of a legally constituted marriage. 
Furthermore, QEJ’s vision statement renounces assimilation tactics and instead 
calls for a refocusing on what the actual, underlying goals are – including how the future 
will be impacted by these goals.  In the midst of writing this thesis during the month of 
December 2013, QEJ announced their decision to close due to insufficient funding.  
According to Dettmer, QEJ’s insufficient funding is a result of “the gay marriage 
movement…has taken funding away from other critical needs for queer people” (35).  
Responding to the news of QEJ’s sad closing, four other queer/radical organizations in 
the New York area (FIERCE, Streetwise And Safe, Audre Lorde Project, Sylvia Rivera 
Law Project) published a statement letter addressing the public/community expressing 
their gratitude for QEJ’s activism and stating their solidarity in the continuation of QEJ’s 
important advocacy work (Audre Lorde Project).  The coalition of these four 
queer/radical groups is a great example of the type of coalition building which my 
intervention recommends.  Although each of the groups has a different centralized focus, 
they all share the common ground of creating a more s cially, economically, and 
politically equitable space for all human beings specifically people who have been 
branded as disposable/vulnerable. 
In understanding how these queer/radical groups appro ch advocacy and support 
strategies that differ from assimilationist tactics, I analyze their perspective on public 
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media expressions and legal reform agendas.  Queer/radical organizations have a 
different stance on news sources and mainstream media than nationalist mainstream 
organizations such as HRC.  Willse believes that “How the media represents politics or 
activism should not be our only concern, but also how activists represent (translate) our 
politics among ourselves” (“Meaningless Political Action”).  However, there are some 
potential risks assumed to be associated with not employing the tactic of mainstream 
media.  One of the assumed downfalls is a lack of kn wledge production being expressed 
to the general public; and instead, an intensified message of only a portion of the 
discussion is communicated.  According to Polikoff, “A consumer of current news might 
imagine that access to same-sex marriage is the most contested issue in contemporary 
family policy, and that marriage is the only cure for the disadvantages faced by lesbian 
and gay families.  Both of these observations would be wrong” (Introduction 2). 
Willse dismantles the illusion of the media as a source for “people” to participate 
in resisting neoliberal agendas by interpreting the idea that the term “people” is just “a 
stand-in for an imagined population of goodhearted, mi dle-class social actors” 
(“Meaningless Political Action”).  Assuming that “people” will react in a very specific 
way is unrealistic.  There is no way of knowing how any one person – let alone the 
general population – will react to any piece of news or information.  Media portrays a set 
message in a very specific way in hopes to persuade its audience’s reactions to coincide 
with its agenda; however, that imposed reaction cannot be fully guaranteed either.  Willse 
points out that even if a queer organization’s goal w s to initiate media presence, the way 
in which “corporate- and/or government-controlled media reports our activism” is 
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ultimately up to the media source which is usually led by neoliberal agendas 
(“Meaningless Political Action”).  And in the case of queer organizing, the neoliberal 
mounting of mainstream media sources could (more than likely) act as a detriment rather 
than benefit. 
Building Coalitions 
I have suggested building cross-community alliances as a strategic approach.  
Cross-movement organizing can help “identify progressive allies from the two [or more] 
movements on issues” (DasGupta), as seen in the above example of the solidarity 
statement issued by four queer/radical groups in response to QEJ’s closing.  This is the 
reality which I am fighting for and also the objective of my thesis.  In building coalitions, 
assessment pertaining to the level and scope of legal involvement is crucial.  On the one 
hand, no economic, property or other legal rights/benefits should be solely regulated 
through the current statute of legal jargon by any governing body.  However, we cannot 
assume that without proper administrative legislation in place “people” will idealistically 
interact with one another on a basis of equity and social justice.  Legal protections 
administrated through law reform are necessary in creating an ethical politics of kinship 
care.  However, legal benefits should be distributed by/to chosen individuals, no matter 
their relationships.  If we only provide benefits to persons based on whether or not they 
are recognized as legal kin (in the current context), we are allowing many folks to fall 
through the cracks of legal protection and we are fu ther maintaining the power 
disparities that create and reiterate disposable populations.  Cahill states that “by 
regulating at the margins, the law gives the state an opportunity to regulate all of us” (75).  
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I want to be able to name my chosen family and be giv n the same respect as anyone 
else’s kinship structure; and I shouldn’t have to fight for my kinship ties to be recognized 
as such in any political or legal debate. 
Paisley Currah’s “Gender Pluralisms under the Transge der Umbrella” initiated 
the idea for building coalition concerning one issue, although he doesn’t explore coalition 
politics in great depth since that was not the purpose of his article.  In order to take a 
critical discourse analysis approach to the issue of dress codes, we must ask ourselves the 
following question: What are the implicit implications that aren’t explicitly discussed in 
dress codes?  As Currah discusses in his article, clothing is thought to be a reflection of a 
student’s gender identity which is further complicated by many school’s regulations 
adhering to gender as innate to sex (which is not the reality for many).  To push the 
analysis farther, I would also add that race, class, nationality, age, among other factors 
play a role in creating and reiterating norms.  Currah mentions that when advocating for 
administration law and regulations regarding dress code in respect to transgender students 
in public schools, the best method is to have a coalition for all individuals who have been 
and will be affected by school dress codes.  He mentions the racial implications that dress 
codes have; for instance, how saggy pants and do-rags are often found in dress codes as 
inappropriate.  Other implicit implications arise con erning dress codes, such as class.  
The status of the students’ clothing is often considered to be a factor in assessing an 
individual, and therefore reiterates certain norms. 
There needs to be a coalitional approach to dress code in order to protect the well-
being of all students.  I will use SONG as an example of how a queer/radical organization 
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might approach the topic of dress code by using its intersectional framework.  If SONG 
were to take up this issue of dress code in public school systems, it would call for an 
intersectional analysis and have a leadership focal point as emphasized in its mission 
statement.  For the intersectional analysis, SONG must assess every potential implication 
that the current dress code iterates in addition to assessing both implicit and explicit 
consequences that a future dress code implementation could affect.  
Many current dress codes do not empower youth to challenge institutions, such as 
the school system’s regulations; however, SONG’s potential reform of dress codes would 
center the idea of leadership by altering the dress codes in a way that empowers youth to 
have an active voice in these decisions.  Empowering youth directly relates to Spade’s 
suggestion of looking at the most vulnerable groups in society.  The marriage equality 
debate centers largely on adults, with the exception of certain family laws concerning 
custody.  This example of dress code looks at the vulnerable – youth.  The creation of an 
ethical politics of kinship care needs to also start with the most vulnerable populations 
who are affected by kinship care; for example youth, trans* persons, LGBQ 
communities, low-income populations, etc. 
Given the example of dress code, how do we envision an ethical politics of 
kinship care?  Included in the planning, the reform proposal needs to examine any 
implicit and/or explicit outcomes that it could poten ially impact.  In essence, we need to 
ask this question: how will this alteration affect or impact the well-being of all people not 
only the targeted group(s) the reform intends to immediately undertake but also the 
individuals who the reform excludes to mention or cnsider?  I am not calling for an 
 
95 
ethical politics of kinship care to be dismantled from the U.S. legal system.  Rather, I am 
calling for serious thought about what individuals become the target of legal “rights” and 
how legislation nurtures individuals by providing effective help for the populations 
excluded from the targeted subject right now.  Evidenced by the current situation of 
Montana alternative homes’ lack of state regulation, there needs to be legislation in place 
to protect the rights and well-being of humanity, esp cially humans who have been 
deemed disposable. 
Along the same lines with my discussion on identity politics’ potential of harming 
leftist political agendas, rights are also a necessary evil.  Rights are necessary in order to 
protect a person’s well-being from harms/inequities; rights can be evil due to the 
tendency of rights’ discourse to be targeted towards membership of identity categories.  
For example, marriage rights have been excluded to people who are members of the 
LGBTQ identity category; this exclusion of LGBTQ groups of people also highlights the 
same reason why rights are essential in protecting the well-being of all individuals.  As 
stated by Gamson, identity politics’ main dilemma is that “fixed identity categories are 
both the basis for oppression and the basis for political power” (“Queer Dilemma” 390).  
Identities are often associated with a person’s credibility and validation.  Feelings of 
safety have the potential to stem from identity politics’ approach to unification; however, 
“as long as membership in this group is unclear, minority status, and therefore rights and 
protection is unavailable” (Gamson, “Queer Dilemma” 401).  This quote implies that 
concrete identity categories are necessary for legal r form; a belief that I do not endorse.  
In other words, I think this quote encapsulates the shortcomings of what happens when 
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rights-based movements only take up a single issue related to one group/population: the 
outcome is a limited understanding of identity politics’ role in transformational change, 
and therefore, a limited capability to envision an intersectional, coalition-based, and 
leftist framed hope for our future. 
Polikoff doesn’t believe that “special rights” should be given to married-couple 
families.  Marriage is no more important than any other form of family or kinship care.  
Law reforms valuing all families and kinship configurations need to be proposed which 
in turn “achieves good results, for good reasons, ad makes marriage matter last” 
(Polikoff, “Not a Gay Thing” 53).  Although I do not believe in or promote the institution 
of marriage as it currently exists, I am not remarking on or implying anything about those 
who want to, choose to, or have already been married.  According to Polikoff: 
 
I support the right to marry for same-sex couples as a matter of civil rights law.  
But I oppose discrimination against couples who do not marry, and I advocate 
solutions to the needs all families have for economic well-being, legal 
recognition, emotional peace of mind, and community respect (“Not a Gay 
Thing” 48). 
 
 
This statement is consistent with my view on how we should go about addressing 
marriage reform in relation to the future possibilities of more comprehensive kinship care 
policies 
As a possible alternative to the strategies of the equal marriage rights movement, 
Clare Chambers proposes piecemeal regulation in order to legally protect the rights of all 
individuals who are engaged in kinship care formations.  Piecemeal regulation rejects 
marriage legislation’s bundling of rights and instead “involves the state regulating the 
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different functions or parts of a relationship separately” (Chambers 137).  Equally 
important, piecemeal regulation “involves no special status” (Chambers 137).  Piecemeal 
regulation revolves around the idea that many kinship care structures – including ones 
that are not currently recognized – tend to have similar functions as one another such as 
caregiving practices, for instance the care of a child.  These caregiving practices deserve 
legal regulations to protect all individuals involved.  According to Chambers, there are 
many advantages to employing piecemeal regulations: 
 
It is more flexible, allowing a variety of ways of life to receive appropriate state 
attention.  It can meet the needs of caring relationships, but does not assume that 
all caring relationships are attached to other forms of intimacy or that people have 
only one sort of caring relationship.  And it dispens s entirely with one special 
status to which special recognition, and thus endorsement, is attached (140). 
 
 
However, I think the option of piecemeal regulation has potential to still exclude some 
relationship functions that would not be included in its “variety of ways of life” criteria 
list.   
 Neoliberalism must be removed from the cross-movement organizing approach, 
since neoliberalism can “undermine organizing around issues (poverty, health care, the 
destruction of the environment, and so forth) not directly connected to identity” 
(McRuer).  By building a coalition around the common goal of having the legal system 
recognize your own kinship care formation and then protect your well-being through that 
recognition’s benefits, a large collection of indivi uals who evoke solidarity based on this 
political affirmation and at the same time celebrate the intersectionality of differences are 
 
98 
welcomed.  As reiterated throughout this thesis: the more people involved in an effort, 
then the more impact that effort has on transformation l change. 
My intervention lies in the way that queer is often aken up to describe individuals 
identified within LGBTQ communities.  The potential of the word queer has so much 
more validity and promise.  I understand queer to be resistant to the implications of a 
universal tone/connotation and therefore as challenging to the universalistic approach by 
applying queer as an active verb tense.  Rather than placing queer theory within sexual 
orientation constraints, understanding “queer” as an active verb could provide wide-
ranging and nonconforming spaces for academic research and knowledge production.   
Resistance to the marking of a queer definition stem  from the risks associated 
with absolute labels – “to limit its potential, itsmagical power to usher in a new age of 
sexual radicalism and fluid gender possibilities” (Halperin 339).  Instead of queer politics 
being just about queer-identified individuals, I argue that any individual no matter their 
identity can be queered.  By queering the subject, we seek to alter research approaches 
and challenge power disparities generated from declaring which subject to study or 
research.  Creating an ethical politics of kinship care across all communities through 
coalition building is possible with queer politics’ knowledge production.  Queer politics 
aims to be inclusive in nature and challenge/resist what is believed to be as normative or 
fixed identities, especially in relation to the binaries generated within the discourse of 
gender, sex, and sexual orientation.   
Similar to my critical analysis of the “gay rights a human rights” agenda –
regarding the problems apparent in using the identity formation “gay” as a collective, 
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universal identity formation; queer theory’s aim to avoid identity categories within a 
singular definitions and instead invoke intersectionality as a form of resistance provides 
space to experiment with alternative tactics that promote social and political movements 
by taking into account the shortcomings of the approaches discussed in Chapter III.  It 
requires the understanding of the intersectionality of all identities as well as individual 
experiences by refusing to conform to the regulations/limitations of how identity politics 
have been taken up by some scholars to support essentialist notions.  This inner tension 
among queer scholarship can be felt more within community activism rather than 
academia; for instance, HRC created a political shirt with the phrase “Legalize Gay,” 
across the chest.  In response to the shirts’ lack of acknowledgement of trans* identities 
within HRC’s greater political agenda, a shirt with the phrase “Legalize Trans*” was 
issued and circulated around the community. 
Queer politics has the capacity to participate as aform of activism within a 
community.  In order to accomplish this task, we must first begin “to translate central 
ideas of queer theory into a language which can be und rstood…outside the academy” 
(R. Smith 348).  By implementing forms of discourse that are easily accessible to the 
general public/community (as opposed to disciplinary j gon within queer theory) queer 
politics has the potential to extend its reach/thres old, originally established within higher 
education systems, to the rest of its community both in erms of knowledge production as 
well as activism. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 This thesis is not intended to provide answers, but rather it acts as a pivotal 
moment in creating a more comprehensive discussion concerning kinship ideologies.  My 
purpose is to introduce alternative modes of thought and understanding while engaging in 
political agendas related to kinship care, specifically regarding the gay marriage rights 
movement.  Inspired by Eng and Spade’s works, I have furthered their critiques against 
the orientation for marriage within the demands “gay rights” by applying queer theory to 
the current critiques’ limited focus on exclusionary implications.  Saying the marriage 
equality movement excludes others is not enough; the marriage equality movement 
actively produces disposability with the production of gay subjects. 
 Intersectionality can be used as a form of resistance within identity politics to 
celebrate the differences among and within identity categories.  Applying a leftist 
framework de-centers the marriage equality movement and marriage in general in order 
to focus on the creation of an ethical politics of kinship care.  As perfectly stated, “I 
would like to see federal legislation that is designed to deliver benefits and rights based 
on my personhood rather than on whether or not I have been a winner in the dating 
game” (Boggis). 
I would like to make clear that marriage is just as v lid of a choice as any other 
type of kinship care; I am not opposing the gay marriage rights movement but rather 
emphasizing the need for a more comprehensive approch that creates an ethical politics 
of kinship care by validating any and every variety of its form/structure.  Queer has to be 
a part of the approach to understanding the production of a variety of disposable people.  
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What is understood as queer needs to be exploded; it can no longer be viewed as just a 
sexual orientation opposite of heterosexual.  I argue that queer politics needs to be not 
just about queer-identified individuals, but rather about reconfiguring how kinship is 
thought of, legislated, and administrated.  After validating every person’s choice to 
identify themselves within any given kinship care formation as valid; our next step is to 
focus our energies on administrative law reform that more effectively and efficiently 
nurtures humanity and supports the well-beings of all individuals.   
After reading my thesis, I challenge you to self-reflect for a period about what 
your own kinship care formations look like.  How does the gay (marriage) rights 
movement affect you, loved ones, and people you’ve met throughout your life?  
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